

One Dollar a Year

Twenty-five Cents per Copy

The Journal of
**LIBERAL
RELIGION**

This Issue—

•
**ROUND TABLE
THE
MEANING
of
HUMANISM**

By **Curtis W. Reese**
and five colleagues

•

The Religion Men do not Recognize
AN EDITORIAL

The Minister as Counselor
By **EDWIN C. BROOME, JR.**

The Intellectuals Run Out
By **HARRY C. STEINMETZ**

**"Status" as a Political and Religious
Motive**

By **SEBASTIAN De GRAZIA**

The Destiny of the Americas
By **JOHN H. HERSHEY**

New Service Materials
Edited by **VINCENT B. SILLIMAN**

•
SIGNIFICANT BOOKS REVIEWED. Mumford's *Values for Survival*, by **Randall S. Sten-**
ton; Eberhart and Rodman's *War and the Poet*, by **Jacob Trapp**; Santayana's
Sea of Christ in the Gospels, by **Dale DeWitt**; Dewey's *Problems of Men*, by **Edwin**
Buehrer; Flamm's *Economic Program for a Living Democracy*, by **Charles H. Coyle**;
Lewis Adamic's *Dinner at the White House* by **Edward Drew Gourley**.

The Journal of

LIBERAL RELIGION

PUBLISHED quarterly by the
Unitarian Ministerial Union,
with the cooperation of the Uni-
versalist Ministerial Union.

To encourage creative, scholarly writing by religious liberals.

Editor
EDWIN T. BUEHRER

Associate Editor
HARMON M. GEHR

Editor, Service Materials
VINCENT B. SILLIMAN

JAMES LUTHER ADAMS
RALPH W. BAILEY

Editorial Board
HERBERT E. CLAPHAM

THADDEUS B. CLARK
CURTIS W. REESE

Editorial Counsellors

JOSEPH BARTH

J. RAYMOND COPE

DELOS W. O'BRIAN

JOSIAH R. BARTLETT

DALE DEWITT

KENNETH L. PATTON

ERNEST CALDECOTT

DANA MCLEAN GREELEY

ALFRED STIERNOTTE

KARL M. C. CHWOROWSKY

RANDALL S. HILTON

ALEXANDER P. WINSTON

Business Manager
HERBERT E. CLAPHAM

CORRESPONDENCE should be
directed to the editors at 301
North Mayfield Avenue, Chicago
44, Illinois. The subscription rate
is \$1.00 per year, or \$2.50 for
three years, *payable in advance.*

ALL contributions submitted to
the editors should be accom-
panied by suitable return en-
velope and sufficient postage.
Manuscripts cannot be returned
unless this formality is observed.

The Religion Men Do Not Recognize

AN EDITORIAL

The pages of LIBERAL RELIGION have been, since its inception, devoted to what might be called a new faith among men—a faith which many people, both church and unchurch, have not yet come to recognize as religion, much less as *high* religion. There is a very great deal of that kind of religion lying around in fragments, a little here, a little there. It does not necessarily go by the name of Judaism, or Christianity, or Buddhism or Hinduism. Sometimes it goes by the name of materialism, or agnosticism, or atheism, even. Sometimes people call it simply science or poetry or drama or evolution, or love of nature. It is sometimes called ethical idealism, or naturalism or humanism; but by the priests and preachers of orthodox religion, speaking weekly from ten thousand pulpits, it is seldom if ever called religion.

In the opening paragraph of a recent book of science* a distinguished biologist warns the reader that “in approaching the realm of biology as a science it is well to discard all pre-conceived ideas of life, traditions as to its origin, and all metaphysical speculations,” because, “viewing these things objectively is a safeguard against shock to prejudice or to religious belief.”

Again and again scientists, historians and philosophers have had to warn their readers to cultivate the open mind as a safeguard against the many things traditional religion has taught as final or unchangeable truth. The warning is still timely, and it is orthodox religion more than any other human enterprise against which that warning has had to be spoken.

It is of course only partly true that religious faith is to be found at the altar, or that it comes from out of the past, or that it is taught within the covers of a “holy” book.

Moreover, it is not at all true that it was given to us by

*Gary N. Calkins, in *The Smallest of Living Things*. [Page 1]

grace from out of another world, although of this many religious believers have hardly yet become aware. Here and there men have made the thrilling discovery that religion can be a completely this-worldly experience; but if we are to understand what that means, and to be inspired by so revolutionary a concept, we are compelled to change some of our most stubborn ideas both as to what it *is* and what it *does* for people—and how.

Traditional religion—and that, of course, includes traditional Christianity—will never again be a great force in the world unless and until it can renew itself from within to such an extent as to be almost unrecognizable. Indeed, it must all but cease to be what it always has been or hoped to become. There are few signs that organized Christianity is making any measurable progress in this regard; and even liberal evangelicalism accepts basic world concepts only grudgingly and piecemeal if it accepts them at all. Indeed, religion on the whole, has probably more catching up on its agenda of unfinished business than any other major enterprise which human beings have ever undertaken. Heaven and hell, sin and salvation and grace, God and immortality—these, and a dozen other words, for example, can no longer mean what historic Christianity has long insisted they must mean, despite the present-day herculean attempts on the part of the spokesmen of neo-orthodoxy to retain in them some semblance of meaning which associates the new with the old.

The Ancient Versus the Modern Faith: Some Contrasts

The ancient faith has stressed salvation as the work of rescuing men and women from out of this world, and preparing them for another. Even “liberal” Christian preachers have recently warned their congregations that inasmuch as the atom bomb can be expected to destroy our present world, a Christian believer has no choice but to prepare himself for the life to come. The new faith, itself not entirely undaunted by the atom bomb, requires nevertheless that we bend our efforts to the exclusive task of preparing men and women—individually and as a social whole—for a more intelligent and purposeful life here on earth.

The ancient faith was, and still is, afraid of new truth.

It fears and condemns those who by their discoveries undermine or discredit the things people have always held to be true. The new faith joins science and history and philosophy in its eager welcome of new truth even when it destroys every belief which in other ages constituted man's religion and his scheme of salvation.

The ancient faith is sectarian and provincial. It was designed and developed for Egyptians, or for Persians, or for Jews or for Gentiles. The modern faith summarily rejects all exclusive notions about religion, and seeks within the larger human fellowship the common ground of justice and of wonder upon which all can meet without doing violence to the particular insights achieved by each, or the common truths that hold for all.

A Host of Saviours of Every Race

The ancient faith has its Saviours and its Redeemers, its Buddhas, its Messiahs and its Christs. The modern faith accepts all wise men and good, regardless of the culture or the race or the age from which they may have sprung, as bringing each his unique contribution to the progress of mankind. It envisions the world's need, not in terms of a Christ upon whom the burden of salvation rests; it thinks, rather, of a host of saviours of every race and clime, who by their deeds constitute that invisible choir "whose music is the gladness of the world."

The ancient faith makes a sharp distinction between this world and the next. The modern faith does not accept such a distinction, for it projects its life design primarily in terms of this world. For us it is quite sufficient to contemplate this earth—revolving around our sun, and in the midst of countless millions of suns and universes—as our dwelling place and our home, whose life we share, whose substance is our flesh and blood, and in whose infinite embrace our destiny for better or worse is to be fashioned and sustained.

The ancient faith made and still makes a sharp distinction between the material and the spiritual, and keeps them forever separate and apart. Increasingly our modern faith shuns and abhors such a distinction. It fails to find anywhere within our natural world any clear dividing line be-

tween the material and the spiritual. Modern faith sees the flower grow in the soil, and accepts its unfolding beauty and its delicate fragrance as spiritual and sublime to the extent of its continuing ministry to man's sense of loveliness and wonder.

It is the modern faith which we proclaim, the faith which sees man akin to earth and stone and tree and flower—the heir of the inexhaustible natural processes which through the ages at last brought him to birth endowing him with power to think and feel and aspire. Man's heart set on freedom for himself—and his ideal of justice for all his fellow-men emerging in his expanding vision—this, we say, is spiritual and religious in the highest and deepest meaning of which those words are capable.

Man's Rightful Share of Earth's Abundance

There is implied in this another characteristic of modern man's faith. It is his haunting awareness that the time is fast approaching when all men must be allowed to enter into their rightful share of the earth's abundance. There is a thousand times as much power in the world today—machine power capable of serving man—as there was a hundred years ago. There may very well be, ten years hence, many hundred times again as much power as we have today. And the people of the world—the hungry, starving people, the enslaved and oppressed people, the people who were never sufficiently fed and clothed, constituting, as it were, the overwhelming majority of the earth—they know it. The black people and the brown people—pawns all through the centuries of the white people—they know it. Perhaps we should say they sense it now, that, somehow, they must and will share that abundance in the great coming family of man. Their knowing it, their rising aspirations at last to come into their own, can, if properly led and encouraged, become a great new religious triumph for mankind.

Some seventy-five or eighty million people out of our nation's 140 million, have no clearly acknowledged religious faith or loyalty today. Christian orthodoxy has lost most of them forever. It is not a challenge—the fact that they constitute eight out of fourteen people one meets in the give and

take of life? Here are the doubters and the agnostics and the atheists and the indifferent and the confused, moving out from the past, and hardly knowing which way to move. A new and liberating religious faith must arise. It must be for both church and unchurch a voice, and it must invite them into its fellowship until their "haunting awareness" becomes their great expectation. Only such a faith—free and strong and militant—can save America from the blight of a religious orthodoxy which in every major economic and political crisis has thrown itself on the side of reaction, and has frustrated the progress of the world.

Edwin T. Buehrer

AN EDITORIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Because of circumstances beyond our control this issue of LIBERAL RELIGION which—if it could have been published earlier—should in regular sequence be called the AUTUMN issue, is called the WINTER ISSUE.

Needless to say no one's subscription will suffer because of this delay and "omission", for in the mailing of the journal the numbered sequence continues to prevail.

The Minister as Counselor

By EDWIN C. BROOME, JR.

Counseling is no amateur's plaything. The skillful counselor knows that he is dealing with deeper emotional levels in the psyche of his client than appears on the surface. He may not realize how thin the ice nor how deep the waters beneath. Unskillful counseling is worse than none, and many is the clergyman who has learned this to his client's sorrow as well as his own.

That counseling should be part of a minister's work goes without saying. Practically speaking, however, there are fundamental problems which arise in the counseling relationship in the Liberal Church, many of which do not appear in the Orthodox or Roman Churches. The first of these is the absence of ecclesiastical authority. For example, when guilt feelings can be removed, and they often can, by the imposing of specific penances, the counseling relationship remains upon a satisfactory, if primitive level. Once the confessional passes from the scene, however, so-called "spiritual counseling" becomes quite another matter. Often it is little better than a temporary palliative, or catharsis, which soon wears off, leaving the recipient as unhappy and depressed as before. If the liberal minister is to do any counseling within his parish, he should be well acquainted with the techniques of non-parochial, therapeutic counseling, for counseling is more than an occasional visit, it is a separate tool and technique.

Counseling is no amateur's plaything. The skillful counselor knows that he is dealing with deeper emotional levels in the psyche of his client¹ than appears on the surface. The trouble is, he may not realize how thin the ice nor how deep the waters beneath. Unskillful counseling is worse, far worse, than none, and many indeed is the clergyman who has learned this to his client's sorrow as well as his own. Even so, counseling and clinical work generally are assuming an increasing role in church work. Several of the larger hospitals are conducting summer seminars and clinics in clinical and abnormal psychology, but liberals generally are

¹For want of a better word, we shall use the word "client" to designate the individual who comes for counsel—i.e., the counselee.

like horses being led to the water. Many larger parishes have part-time employees who do the counseling, but in most cases, the job falls to the minister.

In the old days, a standard theological school background was enough to enable the minister to deal with so-called "spiritual" problems, and in some instances this still suffices. Counseling, however, that has as its goal the changing of the fundamental personality of the client is a different thing. The goal of modern psychotherapeutic counseling is not the solving of problems for the client, but helping him solve them for himself. This differs from reassurance, or friendliness, or kindness or sympathy. The goal of psychotherapeutic counseling is helping the individual make a new person out of himself. Lack of emotional stabilization, continual demands for readjustment to new problems, the trauma of 20th century life, brings things to the surface which could have remained happily submerged a generation ago.

Non-Directive Counseling Most Effective

All things considered, the best type of counseling for the minister to practice is the non-directive type. Under the impetus of Freud and others, clinical counseling was for a long time directive and diagnostic, and frequently lost itself in the bog of diagnosis, ignoring constructive therapy. Non-directive counseling, begun perhaps by Otto Rank of Vienna, was given its distinctive American twist by Carl Rogers, now of Chicago. It is, in the hands of a skilled counselor, not only more effective, but infinitely less time consuming than a good, rousing six-year analysis, or hours of endless probing in order to make a "diagnosis." Unfortunately, no article can do justice to the non-directive technique; we cannot "teach" it here. The reader is referred to Rogers' manual itself for a full discussion². It is sufficient here to say that the essence of non-directive counseling, as the name implies, is found in permitting the client to take the lead. The counselor asks no questions, passes no moral evaluation, positive or negative, makes no suggestions, gives no advice, makes no diagnosis (to the client).

²Rogers, Carl R., *Counseling and Psychotherapy*. It is understood, of course, that we are thinking in terms of essentially normal people, not mental cases as such.

On the other hand, he is content to *reflect the feeling of the client's* remarks. In an unpublished study, made by William U. Snyder, Director of the Des Moines Child Guidance Center, the following resumé is made of the Rogers technique; we can do little better than quote it in full:

In *Counselling and Psychotherapy*, Rogers points out basic differences relating to the underlying purpose of non-directive therapy as contrasted with directive. First, there is the assumption that "the client has the right to select his own life goals even though these may be at variance with the goals that the counselor might choose for him." The directive counselor assumes that the counselor is in a position to know the best thing for the client to do (i.e., like the old school minister, upholder of the "moral law") and to want to do, and he orients his actions around this philosophy. Obviously it is implicit in this notion that the counselor is an authority or "expert" (like the priest or authoritarian clergyman). Such a type of approach is illustrated in the most extreme forms by such counseling as that of "Mr. Anthony" of radio fame, or of Dr. George Crane in his syndicated newspaper column. Another assumption of non-directive therapy is that the client will, if given the opportunity, choose for himself the goal most likely to produce the truest happiness. The desire of the therapist, therefore, is merely to create a situation in which the client is able to evaluate his goals in terms of their most probable ultimate outcomes. The non-directive therapist does not in any sense superimpose upon his client his own standards or morals, or those of the society he prefers. As a result, the client is not forced into a position of defending what he believes to be desirable goals and is therefore able to focus his efforts on an unprejudiced evaluation. A third principal tenet of non-directive psychotherapy is that the client should be brought by means of the counseling situation to a position where he is able to operate independently, and if possible in a reasonably short time. In other words, he is able to proceed "on his own" in new situations as a result of having passed through the change of attitude produced in the counseling relationship.

Unfortunately, protocols and recordings of counseling situations between clergymen and members of their parish are not available; we must rely upon records taken in non-parochial situations. We cannot here reproduce lengthy hour-long counseling sessions, and must satisfy ourselves with a single record, or better, part of one. The situation is that

of a discharged veteran and a U.S.O. counselor, trained in the Rogers technique:

Veteran: Say, what's the matter with this town? You go down the street and don't see any one you know, you walk into the restaurants, and they give you the cold shoulder, you look for a job, and they have to see your discharge papers and ask a lot of nosey questions.

Counselor: People just don't give a damn.

(We might be tempted to reassure the veteran at this point with: "Well, I wouldn't worry about it too much, it'll open up sooner or later." It takes little imagination to hear the veteran's "Oh, yeah?" Any such remark on the part of the counselor is destined to create resistance, to betray a lack of sympathy and understanding, and to repeat the same kind of cold shouldering he has experienced thus far. Any type of questioning would be equally fatal.)

The veteran continues: It wasn't this way overseas. It was tough over there, but you had your job and you did it. I was a tail gunner in a fortress. I could have let the armorers look after my guns, but I never let it go at that. I always checked 'em over myself to make sure they were right. The whole ship was no better than any man in it, and if one gun went out, you were all likely to be done for.

Counselor: This is quite a contrast from overseas.

(Any attempt at praise for the work done overseas would be useless. "We are all grateful for what you boys did over there" might well elicit a very unfavorable reaction. Interpretation of a diagnostic type would create further resistance: "The trouble with you is, you can't take the competition in civilian life. You're one of those chaps who would be better off in the army." Any interpretation, even though true, is useless.)

Veteran: You see these guys going around here with good jobs who have had it nice and easy all the time we've been gone, and it just makes you sore. Don't you think yourself that there are a lot of fellows who got their draft boards to defer 'em on pretty weak excuses, and then just stayed at home to make lots of money and have it soft? It makes me boil, just like it used to when my elder brother would sneak out on a Saturday afternoon, leaving me all the work!

Counselor: You are sore because you think you got the dirty end of the stick.

(To have replied, "You're mostly jealous, I suspect" might well have terminated the interview at once. Any negative evaluation, such as: "Now, look here, you know the draft boards were perfectly fair!" might have incited mayhem.

Unfortunately, we cannot follow this interview further; enough has been quoted, it is hoped, to suggest the type of technique the non-directive represents, and to suggest what is meant by reflection of feeling.

The Technique of Reflected Feeling

Reflection of feeling is a technique in itself. It consists in responding to the client's comment or remark in a particular way. We might say that it means that the counselor expresses in fresh words the essential attitudes, *but not necessarily the content*, of the client's remarks. The counselor mirrors the client's attitudes for the sake of helping the client understand them better, and to show him that he is understood by the counselor. In the first counselor response in the interview just quoted ("People just don't give a damn"), we find an excellent reflection of feeling. To have attempted to re-phrase the remark of the veteran would have helped little, while a mere intellectual repetition would not necessarily have caught the attitude of anger and contempt which the veteran was expressing. This type of response is not as easy to make in the moment of the interview as it would appear on paper, and a study of several protocols, particularly the lengthy report in the latter portion of Rogers' manual would be helpful.

Another type of response is *simple acceptance*. This consists of merely saying: "I see. M-hm," or something of the sort. It indicates to the client that the counselor accepts him and understands what he is saying. There is often no point in interrupting a flow of feeling and language on the part of the client by reflecting feeling. Examples of this type of response may be noted below.

The so-called "structuring statement" is also part of the Rogers technique. It consists of a simple explanation of the type of relationship which exists between the counselor and client. Quite often this type of response is required when the client asks a question, or asks the counselor what his opinion is, or in response to a demand for advice. The protocol just quoted continues with a situation like this, in which such a demand is answered by a structuring statement:

Veteran: My mother doesn't have much (money), and she

pretty much lived on the allotment that I sent home. I never knew just what to do about that. It seemed to me that I had a right to keep enough to enjoy myself on. Oh, I didn't do any high living; of course some of the fellows sent home more, but it seemed to me that I was doing pretty good if I sent home . . . dollars out of the . . . dollars I was getting paid. What do you think? Doesn't that seem fair to you?

Counselor (a structuring statement): What I think really isn't so very important; the important thing is how you feel about it.

Note:—any attempt on the part of the counselor to reassure the boy through praise such as "That was very generous of you," or to evaluate negatively: "Well—uh—you might have done a little more than that, perhaps," would have turned the counseling relationship into a situation in which the client would feel impelled to justify what he had done. A structuring statement, implying a description of what the interview relationship was, a refusal to evaluate, interpret, blame or praise, leaves the client free to pursue the matter, or to take up a fresh phase, and above all, does not place him on the defensive.

The Minister's Peculiar Problem

Whereas the U.S.O. counselor, the clinical psychologist, the guidance director, and others of that type, have problems inherent in any counseling relationship, the minister has additional ones which should be enumerated and faced frankly. The first of these is a particular form of resistance. In the hands of a skillful, non-directive counselor, resistance ordinarily does not arise in the course of the counseling situation, since non-direction avoids transference, the source of most resistance. In the church situation, however, it develops at once. The client comes to the minister full of resistance; this takes various forms: 1. Only too frequently, the client does not come until it is too late. This is often the case in marital and domestic situations. 2. Resistance takes the form of what might be called the "surface religious problem." This is nothing more than a kind of religious wedge which the client uses to open the discussion. A young girl, about to enter college, was sent by her parents—highly religious people—because she frankly admitted she did not believe in God. The problem was clearly not that of a religious belief, which mattered little to her, but an ad-

justment to a more or less conservative parental situation. To have attempted to dispel her doubts by trotting out the traditional philosophical and theological arguments for the existence of God, would have been futile. She would have gone away, reaffirmed in her conviction that ministers didn't know much. It can be affirmed that a problem presented in religious terms is distinctly not a religious problem, originally, but the rule of simple reflection of feeling must allow her to express her doubts and her hostile feelings. In due course, the deeper levels of the problem will begin to emerge.

3. The halo effect. As far as the ministry is concerned, this appears ordinarily only in its negative or destructive form. Ministers as a class are looked upon as persons little skilled in the problems of this world, but rather given to speculations about the next. The minister is the upholder of the MORAL LAW, the Consecrated One, whose profession requires he be shocked at many things. He is not the person to whom we reveal our hidden sins. When such resistance is noted, perhaps the best thing the minister can say is: "You feel there are some things you ought not to tell me." At any rate, to probe, to pry out confessions, to do any of these things might well turn out disastrous for the relationship, and develop deep-seated resentment.

A portion of an interview from my own experience—although the situation was not too well handled—may serve as an example. A young man came into my office to pay a "social call" on his return from the service. In the course of our conversation, he revealed that he was considering asking a certain young lady to marry him. After more than an hour, during which the girl, her background, her intellectual and social suitability, and the like were discussed, it became increasingly obvious he was holding something back. It was the fact that I was this other-worldly upholder of the moral law (the halo effect) that was interfering. A portion of the conversation follows:

Client: I sometimes wonder if we are suited in other ways, too.

Minister: (To have asked: "You mean, sexually?" would have shut him up quickly) There are other problems besides those we have been discussing.

C. Yes. (Pause)

M. You are wondering whether you should tell me about them. (Not, "tell me all about it!")

C. Yes. You see, you're a minister; it would be very embarrassing to—er. . .

M. It is difficult to tell some things.

C. Yes. You see, it involves somebody else.

M. I see. (Long pause, during which M. fills his pipe.)

C. Well, I'm not sure I should ever . . . Oh, hell, this is embarrassing. Well, what I mean is—I'm not sure I should ever marry anybody.

M. That is a real problem to you. (Not, "What makes you think that?", or, "That's not the way you should feel").

C. Yes. You see, I've been wondering lately if there wasn't something the matter with me.

M. M-hm.

C. You know—what they call impotency.

(It is here that many would be tempted to ask numerous and embarrassing questions. How did he know this fact? What made him think so? and the like.)

M. You feel that if you were impotent, you shouldn't ask any girl to marry you?

C. Yes, you see, before I went into the army, there was a red-head I knew. . . .

The conversation continued, until the hysterical basis for an assumed impotency began to reveal itself. In the course of three interviews, C was able to gain insight into his own feelings and attitudes, and to get constructive help with his fundamental, and highly intimate, problem.

No Traditional Church Assurance, Comfort, Solace

In addition to resistance, there are other problems which derive from the counseling technique in the church situation. Although the traditional business of the church has been to give assurance, comfort and solace, these have literally no place in this type of counseling whatever. Reassurance simply does not reassure. Imagine trying to reassure the young man just discussed. The neurotic who believes his wife no longer loves him, or is unfaithful, will not change this belief regardless of the evidence. It follows, of course, that reassurance of the supernaturalistic type ("God will take care of you") is worse than useless.

If reassurance is the first prohibition for non-directive counseling, the giving of advice is the second. Not only does

this create resistance, but permits the client to embark upon a course of thought in which he builds up his own counterwill against the advice. He finds reasons, sufficient for himself, why he should not adopt the suggestion, or why, in his particular case, it won't work. The minister simply does not understand his feeling. Pronouncements from canon law and morality, of the "Jesus would say . . ." type, are of course, entirely taboo. Even liberal versions of the same thing are beyond the pale. True, liberal clergymen are less likely to offend than the orthodox group, since they are not morally or ecclesiastically bound to uphold certain precepts. Even so, the minister-counselor must never forget that his client looks upon him as one set apart from the rest, regardless how much he may feel himself to be "one of the boys." To the liberal, as to others, the temptation to speak *ex-cathedra* is often almost overwhelming.

Emotional Conversion Is Forbidden Ground

Emotional "conversion" is also forbidden ground for the church counselor. Eliciting promises not to drink any more when the deep causes for drinking remain unchanged will probably fail in 100 percent of the cases. Even if it should succeed, the symptoms of the neurosis—which is what obsessive drinking really is—would only take another, and perhaps more devastating form. It is recognized in psychotherapy, as it is in medicine, that the removal of a symptom does not constitute a cure of a disease. Taking the pledge, in any form, is literally worse than useless, since it ignores the underlying causes of the obsession, whatever it may be.

Moral evaluation, interpretation ("you feel this way because . . .") are equally harmful, and at best serve merely to delay the therapy itself. In other words, we might state categorically that all the traditional ministerial attitudes, save the desire to be of real help to the individual in trouble, must be abandoned in the counseling relationship.

One of the small, but constantly annoying problems in the minister-client relationship is the absence of a specific fee. A minister cannot charge a fee for counseling. To those inexperienced in the field of counseling, this may appear a minor point. The presence of a fee changes the status of

the counselor from that of rank amateur to that of professional, and the minister-counselor is a professional counselor as well as professional minister. The presence of a fee has a further beneficial effect on the relationship of counseling. If resistance develops, and it may do so in spite of the most careful precautions, the client is less likely to break off a series of sessions. Sometimes sessions occur which, to the client, seem utterly futile, and he becomes discouraged. It may be tempting to terminate the relationship at that point. A fee is an anchor to windward. But with his own parish, a minister cannot charge a fee. Counseling is a part of the service which the church should render its people. On the other hand, when a client is referred to the minister by his family physician, and is not a member of the church, or when he comes of his own accord from outside the church, there is probably no reason why a donation to the church should not be made, but paid directly to the church treasurer.

One of the last, but by no means least difficulties which the minister must face is the difficulty of instituting a series of counseling sessions at the outset. Rarely is it possible to do anything much in a single hour, and for reasons too complex to discuss here. On the other hand, few contacts should be of more than an hour's duration. A series of contacts, at mutually convenient intervals, is almost always necessary for good therapeutic results. The client must be free to stop when he wants, or decide that he does not need further help. This may undo several hours of careful work. The only place where this problem can be handled satisfactorily, if indeed it can be done at all, is in the first contact. It is here, after a time has passed, that the minister might take the lead (the only time in the entire relationship he may do so, and this is contrary to the non-parochial Rogers technique) and say: "Well, now, we only have an hour today . . . I think it might be well if we planned on a series of these little talks. There are probably a number of things we won't get to today." At the close of the hour, he can say: "Well, now, let's see—I'm free on Wednesday at four, or I could see you Tuesday at two." The allowing of alterna-

tive hours preserves the non-directive aspect of the relationship.

There are special dangers which a clergyman runs into in a counseling program. One of the major dangers is gossip and lay misinterpretation. Since counseling must be done behind closed doors, the minister must be particularly careful when working with a member of the opposite sex. Laymen, often laymen who should and do know better, will misinterpret the counseling relationship, or level criticism against the amount of time consumed in this work. A profound oriental silence is the best treatment that can be recommended. This is true when false charges, arising from wish-fulfilment of libidinal character emanate from the counseling situation.

Another difficulty the minister faces is the reluctance of people to come to his office. Counseling should be done against an institutional background if possible, but it may be necessary to use the client's own living room instead.

It is not our purpose in this paper to discuss visiting the physically sick or the bereaved; this is a problem by itself. It can be categorically stated, however, that the Rogers technique does not help in times of death, at least, not at first. It only helps when the client is under emotional stress of a very different character.

The Rogers technique, as adapted to the church situation, enables us as ministers to be of more specific help to the individual under our care; beyond that, it sets as its goal a therapeutic change of personality which enables the individual to carry on afterwards independently of the counselor-minister. We must bear in mind, when thinking of therapeutic counseling, that the individual comes to grief *because he is the kind of individual he is*. It is the goal of therapeutic counseling to help him make of himself *another kind of person*—in other words, to be born again.

The Intellectuals Run Out

By HARRY C. STEINMETZ

Erasmus and such early liberals may or may not have utilized their opportunities to the full, but they are not going to have another chance. Pious praise of them is worthwhile only if it moves us to undertake more.

Modern religious liberals, from Universalists to Humanists, draw inspiration from Erasmus, the early cosmopolitan modernist; and reiterated approval of Erasmus is at least an annual pulpit or rostrum theme.

With taste and wit Erasmus opposed the clerical corruption and Roman Catholic superstition of his day, with little prevision of the effects of the Reformation and of emerging social freedoms, nor inclination consciously to take a hand at the oar. Many emancipated ethical culturists today oppose with taste and wit the clerical sycophancy and Christian superstition of our times with little prevision of the effects of a pragmatic dialectic and an emerging classless society, nor inclination consciously to take a hand at the oar.

Erasmus lived in luxury while protesting the unfairness of a society so generous with him. Unitarians average the highest income of any religious group in the world, and at least the Western wing occasionally protests the unfairness of a society so generous with them. Erasmus moved from a Dominican fervor, through a pious nostalgia for primitive Christianity, to an urbane disregard of papal sanctions and a contempt for evangelical Protestantism. Most modernists have moved from orthodox Judaeo-Christian traditionalism, through a nostalgic effort to rationalize faith, to an urbane disregard of religious sanctions and a pitying contempt for revivalists of all kinds.

Small wonder then that to many today Humanism is the revelation and Erasmus was its prophet. Aloof, alone, and non-partisan, Erasmus graced an age of polite and superficial discourse with uplifting reflections upon human values and ends; aloof and largely alone in a sea of credulous posers the religious modernists grace an age of sophisticated brutality and uncertain revolt with uplifting reflections upon human values and atomic ends.

Perhaps our analogy is too facile and the implied criticism too hasty. We turn to history; for it is a part of this critique that both Erasmus and the Humanists are Renaissance characters, taking their inspiration from the past and boldly backing into the future.

Satire. Erasmus' Main Literary Contribution

From the Latin Renaissance there issued a free, vigorous art and a sophisticated, indulgent Humanism. From the Teutonic Renaissance there issued an austere and scholarly preoccupation with problems of knowledge and faith, and there emerged a new religion which threatened and finally frustrated the Renaissance. Even Erasmus was blind to the art of Rome. Of music he said, with a reformer's zeal, "There was no music in St. Paul's time. Money must be raised to buy organs when poor, starving creatures might be fed at the cost of them." And of letters: "My fear is that with the revival of Greek literature, there may be a revival of paganism." These remarks accurately reflect the apostolic sincerity of a successor of the spiritual Thomas a Kempis. (We could draw another parallel at this point, with reference to the art and music of nearly all modern ethical culturists, but we refrain.)

In crude but romantic England—the London of Henry VIII, of the suave Sir Thomas More and the scholarly Dean Colet of St. Paul's—Erasmus worked on his Latin translation of the Greek Testament, wherein he subtly satirized the discrepancy between theory and practice, the disciples and the prelates. Satire was the main contribution of Erasmus to literary form, and his fine taste, which saved him from excommunication, linked the literatures of the Southern and Northern revivals of learning.

Taste and satire prepared men's minds for the Reformation but could not move men to action. Taste and satire convicted medievalism of folly but not of sin; and men then particularly needed the lusty motivation of moral conviction. Erasmus, it was said, laid the egg which Luther hatched. "Yes," answered Erasmus, "but the egg I laid was a hen and Luther hatched a gamecock."

Then Erasmus proceeded to spend much of his remaining life in fighting the gamecock and thus in repudiating much of the protest he had launched—and he died almost friendless. One is reminded sadly of the fact that Stephen Zweig, the great modern biographer of Erasmus, who lived quite congenially with his ideals, committed suicide a few years ago.

There is no intention of implying that the birth of Protestantism could be a happy occasion. The birth of no new system of human relations is a happy occasion, and nearly all intellectuals forsake the movements of history when the going gets rough. Frequently the going gets rougher because the intellectuals forsake the movement. Modern students of revolutions recognize this as well nigh universal, and the birth of Protestantism was a revolution.

In the interest of nationalism Christendom split; and Erasmus was an intellectual cosmopolitan. Unity was an abstract value to him, and knowledge, for its own sake, a fetish. It is true that when he asked publicly for the names of "the men who under Lutherism have made marked progress in science," his request remained—for most of his opponents—completely unintelligible. They sought in the claimed word of God sanction for an independent way of life, and Erasmus proposed to test their creed by a cultural criterion irrelevant to the Germans of Luther's day. If Erasmus were alive today he would have to agree that as many scientists have been Lutherans as Roman Catholics but that neither creed has been a factor in the production of science or scientists. However, the interesting historical fact is that the great scholastic humanist did not see in the Separatist movement an enhancement of opportunities for science.

Thought "More Important" Than Participation

A faith is a directive for living or it signifies nothing social. Protestantism gave impetus to and opportunity for democracy; Erasmus irrelevantly asked of it men with leisure and means and interest in scientific investigation. The very suggestion shows clearly how removed from dynamic social reality of his day was the life and mind of Erasmus. His conceit was that his thought was more important than his

participation in the revolutionary movements of his day; the literary conceit of his descendants is that the reflections of Erasmus were promulgative and stimulating rather than documentary and critical.

One cannot deny that Erasmus inspired, later, bold thinkers and men of action; the point is that he did not intend to and that we venerate him for effect without regard to intentions. Erasmus was a critic whom intellectuals came to regard as a prophet. Intellectuals as a tribe usually anoint the critic as a medicine man; he has insight, he knows what they know and fears not looking on the darker, the "realistic" side. Particularly popular is he if he has no solution save loyalty to timeless, liberal, and general values, perhaps to democracy in the abstract without concern with the partisan issues of ways and means. By aloof devotion to abstract values, the intellectual historically has stolen the proper credit from those who have fought and died in order that he might remain non-partisan, in order that he might selectively affirm while opposing nothing.

When Charles V, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, a most unholy confederation of non-Roman states, came from Spain into Germany in 1521, he found the people stirred by a monk, soon before consecrated a priest, named Martin Luther. Luther had been shocked by priestly racketeering and popular exploitation, as had been Erasmus; but Luther set out to do something about it. At first Luther argued in Latin but then resorted to German; soon he was supported beyond his hopes not only by shrewd German and Scandinavian princes who were fed up with the empire, but by peasants who were unfed due somewhat to an indulgence racket for the benefit of the completion of St. Peter's in Rome. The situation looked so ominous that Charles V called an imperial conference on the banks of the Rhine which is known to us as the Diet of Worms. The observation is irresistible that there the worm turned and the diet proved unpalatable. Luther refused to recant his heresy. He contended boldly that the Church was unjustified in its practices, grasping, avaricious and scripturally un-Christian.

In *The Legacy of the Liberal Spirit*, Fred G. Bratton says significantly:

The conspicuous thing about the Diet of Worms was the absence of Erasmus. That was probably his last chance to effect a reform within the church but he preferred to stay in his attic in Basel, where he secretly sympathized with the cause of the Reformation and openly lamented the fanaticism of rebellion and the increasing violence of the Peasant's Revolt.

A final plea came from Luther:

I have been sitting quiet long enough, my dear Herr Erasmus, and though I have been waiting for you, as the greater man and the elder of us twain to make the first move to break the silence between us, yet, after so long a wait, my love urges me to make a beginning myself, by writing to you.

Contemplating Erasmus in his attic—the liberal in his ivory tower secretly sympathizing with the cause of the Reformation and openly lamenting the fanaticism of rebellion and the increasing violence of the Peasant's Revolt—Luther, the man of action, at least at this crisis still a man of action, lost his patience and exclaimed:

For since it is obvious that the Lord has not yet endowed you with such constancy, such courage and such sense, as should lead you to fight this monster boldly, shoulder to shoulder with us, I would not expect of you what is too much for your strength.

The papacy was a preposterous monster to Luther; but to the liberal of taste and wit, who lived on the bounty of the social nobility—as have the liberals rather unconsciously ever since—the corrupt papacy still seemed amenable to reform, from within, and Erasmus remonstrated with Lutheranism as being disruptive. This seemed merely a tolerance of evil to Luther; for what had Erasmus been debunking for decades? Surely a time arrives in the course of a conflict which must be seized, a crisis arises which tests conviction and character! Yet here was Erasmus, the eternal critic, carping at him, Luther, for remaining true to the trend of the times. Luther wrote impatiently:

I should . . . have preferred it had you thought fit to refrain from devoting your gifts to mingling in our affairs;

for although, with your standing and your eloquence, you might achieve much, yet it would be better, since your heart is not with us, for you to serve God only with the talent he confided to your safe keeping.

The split between the intellectual and the man of passion was basic and most unfortunate. It would be pleasant for an obvious thesis if one could eulogize Luther as a fine man of action; but we cannot and our thesis is not so simple. Luther was a man of religious feeling, some cunning and little social insight. He seems to have recognized no more indebtedness of the Reformation to the Renaissance than Erasmus recognized responsibility of the Renaissance for the Reformation. Neither recognized gradual changes in the relations between men as leading to qualitative crises; each was a spokesman for forces loosed by breakdown in the guild system, the rise of banking and mercantilism and their creation of nascent national interests. The peasants of Germany struggled for freedom from taxes, for rights to tillable lands, for an unrigged market, for freedom and security from all that the priests and the princes represented. The peasants revolted, burned castles, crucified a few Bishops and seized lands.

All Alike Repudiated Democracy

They lacked a leader, but as Erasmus failed Luther, so Luther failed his people. They were priests, and medicine men survive as allies of the tribal chiefs. The Elector of Saxony led in the diversion of the revolt by protecting Luther. The princes of Germany unquestionably saw in the Reformation a means of securing unity in opposition to the Holy Roman Empire and Charles V, while preserving religion as a means of social control. As between the peasants and the princes, Luther chose the princes, and the Reformation lost its social promise. Luther's disciplined Saxon soul repudiated democracy, and the church he founded with great energy has been indifferent or hostile to democracy ever since. One example will suffice. In quadri-centennial celebration of the Reformation, in Wittenberg on the very anniversary day, October 17, 1917, the German Evangelical League issued a Manifesto containing this statement.

We especially warn against the heresy promulgated from America that Christianity enjoins democratic institutions and that they are an essential condition for the establishment of the kingdom of God on Earth.

The German princes knew what they were doing when they backed Luther.

To Luther—the religious promoter—the iconoclastic humanist became anathema. Finally the intolerant Luther issued his own bull against the Catholic iconoclast:

He who crushes Erasmus cracks a bug which stinks worse when dead than when alive. I hold Erasmus to be the greatest enemy of Christ . . . when I pray 'Blessed be thy holy name', I curse Erasmus and his heretical congeners who revile and profane God.

The tragedy of the times was the cowardice toward reform of Erasmus, and the separation of the true intellectual from the man of action and pseudo-intellectual. Neither instructed the other. Luther repudiated the pope but failed to grasp the import of Humanism; Erasmus repudiated Luther but was himself posthumously repudiated as an atheist by the Church, and in his life he failed to grasp the opportunity for Humanism which the Reformation offered.

Erasmus has been venerated as a great free soul and as a model liberal, but it is possible to view him as the great mugwump, the saint of all who would cherish dilemmas in the name of freedom. Truly a man may become famed for the dilemmas he keeps, but he may also become notorious for how long he keeps them.

Deserted by both religious parties, feeling alone and tired of "this mad world," as he described it, Erasmus died at Basel in 1536.

As he lay dying the Pope offered the bribe of a red hat, precisely as he had offered it to Voltaire 230 years later. Neither man accepted, but Voltaire fought back. One should probably not try to judge Erasmus for he did not outlive the offer and merely refused it as a burden. Some men however—even the Pope—might know better than to try to bribe. The intellectual conceit of Erasmus came near to betraying him.

That Erasmus was a great man cannot be gainsaid; and evaluation is difficult and, at this distance, arbitrary. When one moves religiously from contemplation of a life toward a moral conclusion, the difficulty compounds. Innumerable morals may be derived.

Surely from the story of Erasmus may be suggested the dependence of progress upon both thinker and actionist. Their separation may be tragic. Criticism calls for a proposal. Discussion calls for a conclusion, a conclusion calls for a program, and a program calls for practice. Theory is tested by practice and practice is rendered intelligible by theory. Their repeated comparison is necessary in Humanism as well as in chemistry.

No Vicarious Discharge of Social Obligation

A further possible conclusion is that intellectualism as an end for life is unsatisfactory compared with achievement. There is no such thing as vicarious discharge of social obligation. A modern minister can no more play Luther in interracial fellowship—and his congregation remain Erasmuses, without a break—than Erasmus could criticize what Luther attacked without a break between them. So it is in all good works. Unitarians and other religious liberals will either instrument Humanism or the stream will flow around them.

Another generalization pertains to the necessarily emergent character of Humanism. Erasmus revived and passed on the Humanism of antiquity.

There is precedent for Humanism but its strength does not lie in precedent. Erasmus fortified men for breaking with the past, but he fired no definite aspirations and he showed no provision of a scientific Humanism which located values in the future and submitted its program to the scientific test of prediction.

Erasmus and Voltaire had much in common. Both surpassed as critics of the injustice of Rome; both drew their intellectual support from the thinkers of England; both remained nominal Catholics. Both were bribed with the offer of a cardinalship, but on intolerable conditions, and both were posthumously condemned and their works placed on

the index expurgatorious. Both lived comfortably but were not too sycophantic considering their times. Yet of the two, one may prefer Voltaire for reasons which would require another essay. His Humanism, for one thing, is based more upon nature than upon scriptures. Of course the question arises legitimately as to whether Voltaire could have achieved so much if it had not been for Erasmus.

One may speculate that he could have, for he was a cleverer and bolder operator—and the times were riper. However, the point is that Humanism changes, and that there is a danger that religious Humanists, like the men of the Renaissance, will not keep one ear to the ground. The times are ripe for a dynamic Humanism which cannot be inspired by devotion to any earlier formalation. Religion is forever threatening to bog down in scholasticism.

Developments in the Orient are both a threat and a promise. If any development toward democracy or industrialization threatens us, then something is wrong with us. We cannot help remembering that during the years of our devotion to Erasmus, our leaders were appeasing Japan to the disadvantage of China and, it was hoped, Russia; ditto Germany and Italy, in respect to Spain and Franco of the popular fronts and the U.S.S.R.

While liberals have been reading Erasmus or bravely fighting over again (and largely vicariously) the great moral battles of the past, there has been growing among revolutionary theoreticians from New York to Burma a type of social analysis of which American Humanists know too little. Reading of liberal religious journals and freethinker and Humanist papers, and personal correspondence with many of the writers, reveals little cognizance of labor objectives and of the materialistic interpretation of history that inspires an ever larger proportion of labor organization.

Perhaps half the population of the earth who are influenced by any philosophy of history are influenced by Karl Marx. Yet while in Europe—where the Pope, like King Canute, commands the tide to recede—the dialectic struggle goes on among the followers of Bakunin, Lenin, Kautsky, Kropotkin,

and La Salle, more or less, on the one hand, and Hegel, Spengler, Pareto, Croce, and a line of clerical Fascists, still fulminating, on the other hand, Americans know too little of them and cultivate earlier or more local thinkers. Neglect of those we would oppose affords them opportunity to proselyte dangerously among the naive, and neglect of those we would support leads to narrower and more aggressive programs than should be necessary.

We are arguing of course for more participative interest of Humanists, and such type liberals, in the socio-political affairs of our times. Erasmus and such early liberals may or may not have utilized their opportunities to the full, but they are not going to have another chance. It is more important that people of good will today utilize their opportunities. From a very friendly and sympathetic observation, we doubt if they are being led to do so from occasional pious reiteration of views 415 years old.

"Status" as a Political and Religious Motive*

By SEBASTIAN DE GRAZIA

Perhaps there never were any gods without kings, or kings without gods . . . At present we only know that when history begins there are kings, the representatives of gods.

[KINGSHIP, by A. M. Hocart]

In recent years studies of *status* have paid greatest attention to the varied signs which one category of persons uses supposedly to set itself apart from another. As a result, investigation of the political foundation of status lapsed. The thesis of this article¹ maintains that the individual finds primary status within the status system of the State. All other secular status systems may be considered in that they contain smaller numbers of individuals, are ultimately evaluated in terms of the political status system, greatly fluctuate in relative importance, and sometimes disappear. An examination, then, of the typical process by which a new generation acquires its primary status systems should contribute some insight into the individual's need to acquire status. In this manner it should be also possible to ascertain why the political status system has invariably assumed its primary position.

The meaning of *status* here will be the favorable estimations held by members of a community of the ways persons spend their time. The basic question in the determination of a person's status is not "Who is he?", but "What does he do?" Contrary to the opinion of many writers on the subject, wealth or family are not bases of status, but indications of what a person does or may be able to do. Furthermore, popular belief in their reliability as indications has varied considerably. An historical perspective of the western world alone reveals wide fluctuations in attitudes toward wealth and birth in relation to status.

The judgments of the ways persons spend their time are those made in terms of necessity for the commonweal of the community. For example, persons bearing well-known names, but inactive in all but workless leisure or "gad-a-

*This article is part of a larger study on *Anomie and Ideologies*, and was delivered as a paper at the 1946 meeting of the American Sociological Society, in the Political Sociology section.

bout" activities, sometimes have been the target for such mutterings as, "Why don't those guys do something worthwhile!" The word "worthwhile" in the sentence carries the meaning of "for the commonweal." Many other appraisals can be made of the activities of persons, such as whether one man is a good scientist or another makes good dry martinis, but unless these considerations are placed against a background of a community's welfare, unless the further evaluation is made that scientists or martinis, for example, are good or bad for the nation, they are irrelevant.

Unfavorable estimations made of given ways persons spend their time is *non-status*. In less precise wording, a person has status if the consensus of the community favors the way he spends his time. Consensus may be defined as any agreed upon percentage above the majority.

The *status positions* of a community are the approved ways persons spend their time, as typically designated by the community, for example, a station, an employment, a calling, the duties of a citizen, a vocation, a position, one's work, or a job.

Two other terms should be distinguished—status system and status hierarchy. The *status system* of a community refers to the members' ranking of status positions by three judgments: First, by greatest necessity. This will be referred to as the *top status positions*. The office of the chief executive of a country may be such a position. It is said, for instance, that if the United States Post Office Department receives any letter addressed simply "to the Greatest Man in the World," it will unhesitatingly dispatch it to the White House. Second, by ordinary necessity. Activities given this judgment will be termed *member status positions*, and will be applied to such activities as those of a butcher or street cleaner. And third, by unnecessariness. The activities of a thief are often so regarded, and comprise a non-status position.

By *status hierarchy* is meant any more detailed ranking of a status system. For example, upon questioning, the members of a community may rank medical activities higher than legal activities, and yet both may fall within the range of ordinary necessity, or member status positions. Status hier-

archies may be classified as individual, class, occupational, elite, and so on, according to the various characteristics of the members making the graded evaluations.

Thus, the status system as presented here is an ideology, a multitude of beliefs or evaluations concerning activities that contribute to the common good. The fact that it is an ideology does not make it incapable of measurement, but discussion of available methods for the precise determination of status systems is beyond the limits of this paper. The problem at hand is to help discover why observers of cultures find that most members of all known communities consciously and persistently attempt to achieve and retain status. What is the derivation of the need to obtain respect for one's activities from members of the community?

The Status Development of a Child

The adults in the community begin to describe status systems to the child shortly after it acquires speech. It appears, however, that a status system acquires major psychological function for the child only after it experiences certain shocks. In the developmental history of the human organism it is possible to make out a series of such critical experiences. All originate in the inability of the human organism from infancy to adolescence to provide alone for its recurring biological needs.

One type of anxiety serves as the prototype for the ensuing shocks. It occurs shortly after the infant links the gratification of his needs with the presence of discernible persons—parents, relatives, or others—who traditionally attend the infant. Then, given the inevitable absence of attendants and the equally inevitable onset of the tension of needs, the organism gives signs of extreme uneasiness, such as panicky crying fits, which disappear only at the ministering presence of the returned attendants. Some of the physiological and psychological effects of this experience recur with every subsequent similar situation.

In slightly later life, the attendants find it necessary on occasional intervals, in order to prepare the child for a social existence, to restrict the free expression of impulse. They attempt to accomplish this by threats—or a partial carrying-

out of threats—to withdraw from the child the satisfying character of their relationship. These threats arouse approximately the same kind of anxious experience in the organism that being left alone did previously. As a consequence the child begins using movements and sounds (suggested by the attendants) that have the ability to restore a harmonious relationship. In other words, the child learns the manner of eliciting signs from the attendants that carry the meaning of reassurance.

These favorable estimations, obtained by abandoning the disapproved activity and by making “affectionate” gestures assure the dependent child that its needs will be taken care of. Since its earliest years the child will have associated these evaluations with the gratification of its most basic needs. And they come to signify the security of a place in the family, a complex emotion often described as a feeling of belonging.

The Revelation of Human Limitations

A third crisis occurs when the child learns through extra-familiar contacts, through parental statements, through simple observation, that its parental attendants may not be forever capable of providing for its basic wants. The revelation of the human limitations of the adults in the primary group, especially when abrupt, involves a deprivational experience comparable to the foregoing situations. One writer, for example, cites the case of a child who was staggered to find its hitherto all-powerful father sobbing over the spectacle of his fruit orchard ravaged by a storm. In the last depression, too, many children were exposed earlier than they otherwise might have been to shaking experiences of distraught parents worrying about the source of the family's means of sustenance.

The exact point of this event in the child's development varies. Rural children in all probability experience it at an earlier age than urban children because they are relatively closer to the titantic forces of nature in the raw, such as droughts, locusts' plagues, etc. In cities the sometimes more subtle observations of the effects of economic, political and military instabilities must first be made.

The third crisis is extremely interesting for the manner

of its resolution. Previously the critical situations were relieved by the ministering of human attendants or by securing benevolent treatment which guaranteed that such ministering was forthcoming whenever needed. The shock of *this* disillusion, however, is cushioned by the prior provision of the anthropomorphic symbols in religious and political beliefs.

All societies up to those of the present day transmit ideas of superhuman entities to its youngest generation at the age at which it apparently becomes capable of elementary abstraction. Yet, until the child is aware of the limitations of attendants in providing for its satisfactions, it has extreme difficulty in comprehending deities in the adult sense. In response to questions about the origin of obvious topographic features of the environment, like lakes and mountains, children will answer that they do not know if it was God or some men who made them; or they may report that they conceive of God as chief of men, or like any other man except that He makes his residence in the clouds, which either He or else some men made. Once the relevant mortal proportions of human attendants have been discovered, the omnipotent qualities previously attributed to them are shifted rather smoothly to anthropomorphic religious symbols.

In the modern nation-state system, the religious symbolism imparted by home and school is joined by the anthropomorphic symbols of nationalism—the kings, the presidents, the nations, the heroes and fathers of countries. But it should not be supposed that the phenomenon is part of the Western world only, and there solely since the time of Rousseau. In somewhat different form it occurs in every society with a political organization. Rousseau's advocacy of the substitution of a "civil religion" for Christianity has not been adopted; religious and nationalistic symbols go hand in hand. But his wish that the loyalties of men to familiar surroundings and customs be transferred to the political community, *la patrie*, and not to a larger community—"the veritable chimera" of a world society—has been granted.

Now the child, in addition to performing acts which obtain reassuring, affectionate expressions from adults in the

primary environment, behaves in ways (not at all unlike his earlier ways) designed to obtain similar esteem from figures he rarely, if ever, sees. These new figures presumably have at heart the interest of a large community, of which he, because of his activities, is a necessary member.

The Adolescent's "Anxious Period"

The final critical experience appears in the years of puberty. Knowledge of the family's intention to withdraw its support in the immediate future arouses the familiar anxieties and insecurities of adolescence. Unlike the others, this anxious period varies greatly in emotional intensity from one culture to another. To a large extent the variation depends on the characteristic mobility of persons within the status hierarchy. If mobility is low, the culture can provide a ritualistic procedure that symbolically takes the adolescent from the place in the family to the place in society. If mobility is so high as to include freedom of occupational choice there can be no set procedure for the adolescent's transition from dependence on the family to "independence" in society.

The time, place, and occasion for the event vary, of course, from culture to culture and from sex to sex. As in the previous crises, some preparation is made to smooth the path. The youth has it pounded into him subtly and directly, unconsciously and consciously; he is being groomed by education and by training for the objective of assuming some task respected by the community. In cultures of intensive mobility within the status hierarchy, the length of the period of mental distress is much greater than the short, tense interval of ritual testing usually found in cultures of low mobility. In this country the *Sturm und Drang* ends when the youth has found a job. The unconscious significance of this act is a place in the community. Any job is a way of spending time approved by the community. A jobholder thus belongs to and is a necessary part of the community.

In summing up, four important threatening situations appear in the early history of the human organism: absence of attendants, withdrawal of affection by attendants, discovery of the limitations of attendants and, finally, partial aban-

donment by attendants. The reason for the similar anxious reaction of the organism to these deprivations is its protracted inability, real or fancied, to satisfy basic needs. Each of these situations was resolved ultimately by behavior that apparently elicited community approval.

Status, then, serves as an assurance that situations of helplessness in the face of needs will not recur. Psychologically, the result of acquisition of status is a feeling of pleasure, an actual reduction of the amount of tension in the organism. The loss of status brings the psychological and physiological symptoms of anxiety, varying in length and severity with the duration of the loss, the possibility of recuperation, etc.

Persons may vary in their need for status because of individual differences in rearing. On the one hand it is possible to find persons who constantly worry about the evaluations people may make of their acts and even of their thoughts, while on the other hand, one can find persons apparently quite insensitive to what others may think of their activities. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into the causes of these individual variations. In tracing the need for status, only the factors that are part of the cultural heritage of most individuals have been considered.

From the described process of transmitting status systems seven elements can be separated and designated as criteria for a primary status system:

1. Top status positions should be described as having an administering (i.e., a directing and provisioning) character.
2. Top status positions should claim an exclusive right to resort to violence or coercion.
3. The activity of top status positions should be described as being designed for the commonweal.
4. Top status positions should have characteristics of supremacy, freedom from interference, or immunity.
5. Transmission of the status system to the succeeding generation should begin shortly after its acquisition of speech.
6. Top status positions should be described anthropomor-

phically during the process of transmitting the status system.

7. The proportion of members possessing status should not appear to fluctuate radically with political or economic conditions.

Reflection on the activities and characteristics of the political sphere will easily demonstrate its almost invariable fulfillment of all of these criteria. Political activity *means* administering and directing, and the state is generally distinguished by its monopoly of violence. Provision for the good of the members of the community is the warrant of political leadership. The state claims aspects of both internal and external sovereignty; for example, it cannot be sued by ordinary persons without its consent, or interfered with by other states. The political status system is implanted well under the fifth year of age of the succeeding generation, and its top status positions can be (and are) easily described in animistic, personified language. Finally, a citizen does not easily lose his status in the political community.

Religious Versus Political Status

The status system of religions fulfils these criteria equally as well. The political and religious status systems seldom have challenged the validity of one another's claims to providing for the commonweal in the respective spheres of the here-and-now and the hereafter. There have been notable conflicts over the margins of the secular and sacred areas. But even though the explicit espousal of a separate sphere for church and state occurs rather infrequently in the chronicles of mankind, the cases of theocracy and *cuius regio, eius religio* represent disagreement over whether the religious or the political status system shall be the higher ranking. Rarely has the religious system cast doubt on the political system's claim that there is much to render unto Caesar. A mutually supporting relationship of the two primary status systems is the usual historical finding.

In the account given of the adolescent crisis it was remarked that the job-holder in this country is a person with status. The job, however, is a category not of the political status system but of the economic process. In contrast, when

Cato the Elder concluded that the activities of a merchant made him a dubious citizen, he was evaluating the occupation in terms of the primary status system of Rome. In later centuries the concept of the citizen—the member status position of the political community—has fallen into partial disuse, having lost much of its active denotation of duties. Since the political and religious spheres have been described as the two most ideally suited in form and ideology for becoming primary status systems, some explanation is needed for the intrusion of a fundamentally economic concept.

One of the most serious challenges the political sphere has had to face in its capacity as a primary status system appeared with the spread of the intellectual arguments of classical economics. Adam Smith's demarcation of the proper sphere of government—keeping internal order, maintaining national defense, and preventing business combination—confined the state almost entirely to a negative or coercive role. The restriction of political functions had more psychological subtlety than is generally realized. Politics became the target for popular vituperation, economics for endearment.

Secondly, the *Wealth of Nations* deprived the state's activities of its provisioning character by proposing "production" as the activity most deserving of high evaluation.

There is one sort of labour which adds to the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed: there is another which has not such effect. The former as it produces a value, may be called productive; the latter, unproductive labour. Thus the labour of a manufacturer adds, generally, to the value of the materials which he works upon, that of his own maintenance, and of his master's profit . . . The sovereign, for example, with all the officers both of justice and war who serve under him, the whole army and navy are unproductive labourers. They are part of the servants of the public, and are maintained by a part of the annual produce of the industry of other people.

Furthermore, the proponents of the economic status system attempted to divest the state of its directing activity. They claimed that the productive life of the community needed no direction. Under "pre-established harmony" and "natural liberty" it was automatic and self-regulatory.

Therefore, laissez-faire. Finally, through the assistance of Ricardo and others, the Business Man was proposed as the holder of the top status positions, while work on the job became the distinctive sign of the possession of member status.

"Status" Within the Classical Economy

A closer scrutiny of the criteria previously established, however, may throw light on the reasons why the realm of classical economy, although successful in blurring the political status system at a few points, has been unable to upset its secular supremacy. First, rather than assume the prerogatives of violence itself, which virtually would have eliminated its distinction from the state, it theoretically at least assigned them to the state alone. Second, the paradox of Bernard de Mandeville—private vices ultimately redound to the public benefit—provided a somewhat ambivalent claim that economic activity was designed principally for the commonweal. Third, although the Business Man became a household hero to some extent, even the guise of Captains of Industry was unable to rival the political figures of monarchs and presidents.

Difficulty in describing the automatic regulation of the system in anthropomorphic language was partly responsible for this last relative weakness. It accounts likewise for the fact that economics as a system of status was never able to penetrate the family so that its transmission began shortly after the succeeding generation's acquisition of speech. Psychologists are nearly unanimous in the conclusion that the influence on subsequent behavior of painful experiences and the manner of their solution varies inversely with the age of the organism. And it has been noted in this paper that at the present time the transmission of both political and religious systems occurs from ten to fifteen years earlier than that of the economic status system.

The transmission of the economic system, however, does occur in what may be considered a second-best time—adolescence. As a matter of record, since adolescence is less of a psychological crisis in communities with a low mobility of persons within the status hierarchy, the industrial revolution was indirectly responsible—together with the other

preceding factors making for the exodus from feudal manors into towns—for creating the *Sturm und Drang* period. Nevertheless, the lateness of transmission is a most serious disadvantage. As one consequence, in times of economic privation the economic status system sinks greatly in relation to the political and sometimes temporarily disappears. The state's new-found ability to intervene objectively (i.e., without profit and loss consideration) to mitigate hardship in such times has increased the estimations of its directive functions.

Another relative weakness of the economic sphere has been the wide fluctuations in the percentage of community members holding member status positions. The job-holder as the member status position proved markedly unstable compared to the Citizen and Believer positions of the state and religion respectively. The psychological effects of widespread loss of status can disrupt a status system maintained by a late transmission period.

The advocates of laissez-faire in their emphasis on free international trade were in one sense making an attack on the much more stable political status position. This was more apparent in the mid-nineteenth century when statements like David Hume's prayer "for the flourishing commerce of Germany, Spain, Italy and even France itself" shocked the patriotic Englishman. And it is interesting to note in this context that attacks on the instability of job status, for example, the demand for full employment today, are frequently couched in a subtle contrast with the permanence of the political member status position. Every American citizen has the right to work or a job, runs the argument.

The above reasons help explain why the protagonists of the status ideology of classical economics failed either to supplement the political status system or establish a completely independent sphere for itself in the manner of religion. The individual has found and will find, at least for the next generation, his primary status within the status system of the political community.

The Promise and Destiny of the Americas

By JOHN H. HERSHEY

Four outstanding leaders of Latin-American thought in the fields of education, literature and philosophy, find themselves in common opposition against every form of economic and military imperialism, and in common support of a program of creative, cultural development distinctively "occidental."

The question of what is the promise and destiny of the New World has been reflected upon deeply by Latin American writers of different countries. With the debacle of Europe, what is the role of the Americas in carrying forward the best in civilization and culture? Should the peoples of the Western Hemisphere remain altogether dependent on what Europe has produced or seek to develop a relatively new culture? In the drama of human history, can the New World not only transmit but improve its Old World heritage for the emerging future of humanity? These and similar questions are both asked and answered in their writings and lectures by four living Latin American scholars from as many countries. They are Alfonso Reyes, man of letters of Mexico; Alberto Zum Felde, literary historian of Uruguay; Francisco Romero, philosopher of Argentina; and finally Enrique Molina, educator of Chile. How do they envisage the promise and destiny of the Americas? In our survey of their inter-American views and activities, we shall proceed from our adjoining neighbor, Mexico, to the southernmost lands of Uruguay, Argentina, and Chile.

Reyes of Mexico: Editor, Poet, Essayist

Let us first consider the inter-American activities and ideas of an outstanding man of letters, Alfonso Reyes (1889-) of neighboring Mexico. During a life which is still full of activity, Reyes has been diplomat, editor, poet, essayist, and lecturer. He is president of the recently founded College of Mexico which has the aim, among others, of pursuing studies not given at other Mexican educational institutions. In the United States, Reyes was honored in 1942 by receiving honorary degrees from Harvard and Tulane Universities. At the third Congress of the International In-

stitute of Ibero-American Literature held in New Orleans in the same year, the Mexican spoke on a subject which seems close to his mind and heart, "America, Cradle of a New Culture." In Cuba in 1941, he presided at a four-day round-table organized by the Cuban Commission of Intellectual Cooperation, and attended by scholars from Europe, Latin America, and the United States. Some years were spent by Reyes in Brazil where he was Ambassador to that country. On at least one occasion he spoke in Rio de Janeiro on the theme similar to that of his address at New Orleans, "The Destiny of America." Reyes was also a diplomat in Argentina both before and after his ambassadorship in Brazil.

Good to Be Sought in Instability

Three ways of looking at man in relation to the world are discussed by Reyes in an article in the New York monthly, *La Nueva Democracia* (July, 1945). In classical antiquity, he points out, the universe was thought to be confined in a circle and static. The good was sought at a dead point of equilibrium, at a middle path between two extremes considered equally bad. But the conception of evolution arose in contrast to the static view, and even came to be mistakenly identified with progress itself. All is considered a process toward some final goal, an incessant movement onward and upward. "Like the Tower of Babel, one floor is built on another until it is imagined we reach heaven."

But this kind of belief in automatic progress, according to Reyes, is inadequate. The philosophy of the "bi-polarity" of the universe and the mind—and the fact of warfare in our epoch—makes necessary a different view of evolution. Its underlying truth was understood in such ancient mythologies as that of the Persian story of the evil spirit, Ahriman, and the good god, Ormuzd, in continual struggle. This more adequate idea of evolution places the quest for the good and the true in the instability and risks of existence itself. Life is seen as a kind of dialectical struggle between good and evil. Obstacles toward the good may be overcome, but new dangers are encountered which must also be met. Thus, instead of accepting the notion of automatic progress, men and

nations must ever be in constant alertness against evil and in continuous devotion to the good. This is a philosophy "fully dynamic toward which we aspire today, and which perhaps will inspire men of tomorrow."

We now turn to Reyes' conception of what all America may become in human evolution, as found in his various articles and particularly in his book, *Ultima Thule* (1942). The Mexican feels that in the midst of the world's present upheaval, statesmen, teachers, writers—and, indeed, the masses of people—should fasten their attention on what all America represents and aims to become. Europe today spells disaster rather than happiness for its inhabitants. The Old World seems to have failed in adequately continuing the culture handed down from ancient times. But since the first discoveries of America, this New World has been a refuge and a hope. Merchants desired gain and gold, Catholic missionaries crusaded for converts, Juan Ponce de Leon dreamed of discovering the fountain of youth in Florida, Puritans and Quakers craved a haven from persecutions, and political reformers sought to realize their ideals of a better political order. These are some of the examples given by Reyes to indicate that traditionally America has been the goal of human aspirations.

America, the "Ultima Thule" of Human Hope

America is the *ultima Thule*. Reyes uses this ancient term for his own conception of the New World now and in the future. "Today, confronting the disasters of the Old World, America recovers the value of a reserve of hope." In the face of strong nationalistic and racial prejudices over the globe, it is only American culture which "ignores, in principle, national and ethnic walls." The New World must be the realm in which the best in Western civilization and culture is transmitted and improved. "The destiny," he writes, of America,

is to attempt to aid the purpose of human betterment and to serve as a theater for good ventures. . . . The grave duty has fallen into our hands of preserving and advancing religion, philosophy, science, ethics, politics, urbanity, courtesy, poetry, music, the arts, industries and occupations. . . . Even today the whole continent is an incarnation of hope and offers to

Europe a home for its human overflow. . . . America began as an ideal and continues to be an ideal. America is Utopia

But it may be asked, "What of the differences within the New World itself, particularly between the United States and Latin America?" Reyes says:

Between the homogeneity of the Latin world and the homogeneity of the Saxon world—the two personages in the American drama—profound democratic sympathy operates as a leveler, a road to harmony. The American nations are not so foreign among themselves as the nations of other continents. Three centuries of elaboration, half a century of hazardous calculations, separated by American independence; another half century of cooperation and coherence. Such is, in its general perspective, the road to America.

Zum Felde of Uruguay: Literary Historian

Alberto Zum Felde (1890-) of Uruguay also faces the question of America in relation to Europe and the future of man. The word "America," however, is used largely by him to refer to Latin America. The Uruguayan has been director of the National Library in the capital of Montevideo. His writings concern especially the field of the literary history of his country. With regard to his activities in other American nations, he gave a series of lectures in Argentina at the Institute of Latin American Culture of the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Buenos Aires. These lectures were later published in a book, *La Literatura del Uruguay* (1939). Zum Felde also visited the neighboring country of Brazil in 1941, the President of Uruguay having appointed him as one of three to go to Rio de Janeiro in a "cultural exchange between the two nations."

In a recent book, *El Problema de la Cultura Americana* (1943), Zum Felde expounds his philosophy of man in relation to history, as well as his interpretation of the role of Latin America in the world. As was done in the case of Alfonso Reyes, let us first consider the Uruguayan's general ideas of mankind and history.

The human individual, Zum Felde points out, is normally a functional unity, a complex whole. His body and his spirit are real, forming a human microcosm. Both must be taken into account in understanding the nature of the individual. To separate him would be like dividing parts of a

tree. It is similar with culture in relation to the world. On the one hand, deterministic naturalism mistakenly attempted to reduce all the complex phenomena of culture to geography, biology, and economics. On the other hand, there arose in reaction to the foregoing an equally narrow view which sought to explain culture wholly by mind. But each of these one-sided explanations is inadequate. Like the individual, culture must be explained by both elements, the physical facts and the mind of man. But while fully recognizing the importance of the physical, the predominating and directing factor in the formation of culture is the human mind and will.

Destiny and Being Basically Identical

If, then, man himself possesses inherent power to create and further culture and civilization, what is his destiny? To know our destiny, the Uruguayan answers, is to know ourselves, and to know ourselves is to know our destiny. Thus destiny and being are basically identical. Being exists in us potentially and is what we truly are. It expresses itself through our own active development in history.

Thus, nature is ruled by its laws, apart from the human will; but the laws of history are those of our own will, because the principal agent of all historic evolution is Man. We are making historic evolution; if we do not make it, then it is not produced; what is achieved has its source in our own being which is realizing itself.

The broad view of man and history having thus been outlined, let us now turn to Zum Felde's interpretation of the place of Latin America in the world. He opposes a narrow and extreme nationalism on the part of any American country, although approving a patriotism that means loving one's native land. True Americanism must be continental in scope. But what should be the relation between Latin America and Europe? Latin America cannot and, furthermore, should not if it could, renounce the values of European civilization inherited particularly through Spain and France. Just as Western civilization is a part of world culture, so likewise Latin America is a part of Western civilization and ought to be integrated with it. Although fully appreciating the historic background of Europe and indeed the whole of

humanity, Zum Felde is opposed to Latin America remaining a "cultural colony" of Europe.

What is the duty of Latin America in this hour of history? First, according to Zum Felde, Latin America needs to be self-critical, examining its role in the historic process. "Our consciousness has been circumferential; its axis has been in Europe. From now on, the historic axis ought to be here; and the circumference will be the world." Secondly, Latin America should seek its own "creative expression" in the various realms of culture.

Latin America must develop its own relative forms of being within the larger whole of civilization. . . . We are *almost* certain that in a future more or less distant, this America must arrive at developing its own forms of culture. . . . Of Western civilization, the most vitally open, the most potential in becoming, is this America; because Latin America . . . has hardly begun to initiate its cycle in history.

Turning now to Argentina, we consider the views of America held by Francisco Romero (1897-), professor of philosophy at the Universities of Buenos Aires and of La Plata, and also at the Free College of Higher Studies in the former city. Greatly interested in the interchange of thought among the American countries, he is president of both the North and the Latin American branches of the Center of Inter-American Philosophical Exchange. In his varied writings, the Argentine not only expounds his own philosophy, but also interprets for his readers the philosophies of other thinkers, such as Carlos Vaz Ferreira of Uruguay, and Alejandro O. Deustua of Peru.

The Universe a Structure, Not a "Collection of Things"

Romero's general philosophical outlook can perhaps be outlined somewhat as follows: The universe is not a mere collection of things, but is structural in its nature. Reality is, in other words, a kind of organic whole; the universe contributes to the part and vice versa. On our planet there are four levels of being which are different though related to one another. First is the purely physical level; second, the vital, manifest in plants, animals, and human beings; third, the mental; and finally, the spirit which is the level of the human person. Of these four main types of being, the physi-

cal is the lowest and the spiritual the highest in the hierarchical scale.

Inherent in all reality, that is, in all these realms of being, is the "transcendent impetus." It is by virtue of this impetus that physical reality can ascend to the level of the living, the living to the mental, and the mental to the spiritual. The lowest expression of the transcendent impetus is the physical, and—conversely—the highest is the spiritual. The human individual is a physical, living, and psychical being. But he attains the highest level when he becomes a person. As such his being and life are directed toward the recognition and the realization of the supreme values of the truth and beauty and justice.

Human Perfectibility: A This-Worldly Task

With regard to Romero's views of the meaning of all America, he explains them in the Cuban literary journal, *Feria del Libro* (March, 1943). First is considered what he calls the double nature of man: what he is and what he ought to be. Historically, this latter side of human nature, the realm of the ideal, has been conceived mainly in three ways. First, the ancient world saw the Golden Age of man in the past; second, "Christianity in general, and the Middle Ages inspired by it in particular, placed the ideal in a celestial world"; and third, the Modern Age inclines toward the idea that human perfectibility is a task and a goal to be realized here on earth.

The part that the Americas play in the Modern Age is then put forth by Romero. Thus:

In the elaboration of the ideal of human perfectibility which will attain in earthly life a permanent progression, a state each time more in accord with the supreme needs of man, the share of America is very great. The New World opens its vast horizons . . . as well for the quest of wealth or adventure as for religious or political nonconformity. Its amplitude permits a relation among men that is more useful and broad; to be all for doing and for what ought to be done, attracting existing energies and arousing new ones. Man received an incomparable impression of his power to see before his own eyes how the results of his effort increase. In a few generations, deserts are peopled, wealth increases, villages are transformed into cities and they into still greater

ones. States are formed, social living is perfected, and culture advances in great degree. On all sides the experience of accelerated progress is repeated. America lives inclined toward the future, and transmits to the Europe of a slower rhythm its youthful conviction that the greatest goals are accessible and that the projection of the human spirit toward the future is a reality that is destined to triumph.

Finally, another Latin American intellectual leader who voices his hopes for the future of the New World is Enrique Molina of Chile. Born in 1871 in La Serena, he is professor of philosophy and president of the University of Concepcion in the Chilean city of that name. Throughout his years of a fruitful life, Molina has written many books on education and philosophy. With reference to his activities in other American lands, he visited the United States in 1918 to study its schools and universities, and in 1940 he again journeyed to the same country as a delegate at the eighth Pan American Scientific Congress held in Washington, D. C. Two books were written by the Chilean concerning both trips. Another of his inter-American activities was his participation at the International Congress of Universities held in Havana, Cuba, in 1930.

The Greek Concept of Being

Some of Molina's philosophical ideas may be summarized as follows. In his various writings the Chilean expresses his conception of the relation of man to what he calls the "Universal Being." This Being is infinite, eternal and absolute in its essence and substance. On this point, Molina says, he agrees with the thought of the Greek, Parmenides. Being in itself is neither good nor bad, neither capricious nor providential. But Being, as Spinoza taught, is contingent and relative in its modes of expression in the space-time world. We are more than spectators of the Absolute; nor need we feel that it is hostile to us. We instead are part of it and live in it. "To exist in a Being full of possibilities is like dwelling in the heart of God." Thus in relation to us, the Universal Being is both immanent and transcendent.

But what of the spiritual in relation to the Absolute? What we call the spiritual is not actually but only potentially in Universal Being. The spiritual appears as reality through

the development of organic, finite forms. On earth these organic forms are none other than human beings who attempt to insert conscious spiritual meaning into the universal current. It is by means of human thought and action that the great values of science, philosophy, religion, art and love are established and enhanced. "Man, instead of being an actor in a cruel play of blindman's buff," says Molina, "is thus a collaborator in creation."

The Beginnings of a Unique American Culture

Let us now turn to Molina's attitude toward the part the New World can play in civilization. On the "Day of the Americas" or Pan American Day on April 14, 1942, he delivered a lecture at the University of Concepcion on, *The Progress of Latin America*. His clear and comprehensive analysis is included as a chapter in his book, *Confesion Filosofica* (Santiago de Chile, Editorial Nascimento, 1942). In referring to the Pan American Union formed in Washington, D. C., Molina says "Pan-Americanism is a spiritual, cultural, and juridical network which unites the nations of the New World." Following their political freedom from the Old World, the Latin American countries, nevertheless, continued to be "vassals" of Europe in the fields of science, art, letters, education, and technique. But the beginnings of a new culture have already arisen in Latin America. Molina mentions such outstanding persons of various Latin American lands as Bello, Sarmiento, Mitre, Montalvo, Marti, Rodo, Dario. In the realm of philosophy, Latin America is at the "dawn of independent thinking." Furthermore, the New World is an example to Europe because of its international practice of fraternity, its love of peace, and its use of arbitration. "With these vigorous forerunners of maturity, America has begun to rise against the spiritual tutelage of Europe." Molina, however, does not believe in repudiating European culture; indeed, he describes the rich cultural heritage that has come from Europe.

In turning from the consideration of Europe to the pre-Colombian culture of the American Indians, Molina states that the latter is worthy of our admiration, especially in its artistic content. Furthermore, the Indians of today ought not

to suffer political injustice or economic exploitation. To elevate their living standards, it is necessary to incorporate them into the national life. Their habits and customs, when not incompatible with civilization, should be conserved.

To summarize, Molina contends that the Latin Americas should be neither cultural vassals of Europe, nor restorers of pre-Colombian Indian civilization. Latin Americans must develop, instead, their own—as he says—“neo-Occidental” culture.

The Chilean concludes his lecture with such passages as the following:

For the first time human history offers in the panorama of America the magnificent picture of the peoples of an entire continent united by free and spontaneous decision for purposes of conservation and culture. . . . The Ibero-American peoples have the imperative of making themselves strong, not for greedy imperialistic ends, but to cooperate in the restoration in the world of a sound spiritual order with ethical meaning. . . . Only with effort and courage—and in no other way—can the future be ours.

A New World Culture

It is extremely interesting to note that Alfonso Reyes of Mexico, Alberto Zum Felde of Uruguay, Francisco Romero of Argentina, and Enrique Molina of Chile are largely agreed in their views of the role of the Americas in human evolution. They agree in what they oppose and in what they favor in the following points.

All are against a narrow nationalism on the part of any Latin American country; all oppose military and economic imperialism. Neither desires an America which is merely an imitator of European culture. On the affirmative side, the four Latin Americans gladly accept all that is best in our heritage from the Old World, valuing highly its science, art, philosophy, and literature. They emphatically add, however, that the New World must itself develop at least a relatively new culture, and they believe a beginning is now being made in various American countries. Finally, Reyes, Zum Felde, Romero, and Molina express their faith that in the process of human evolution, the Americas now have the possibility and the opportunity of creating a truly New World of peace and fraternity.

NEW SERVICE MATERIALS

Antiphonal Invocations

Edited by VINCENT B. SILLIMAN

The four invocations following are interesting alike in form and in phraseology. They are taken from orders of service arranged by the Rev. Charles Pease for the use of the First Unitarian Society of Spokane, Washington.

I.

MINISTER: Thou Infinite One: We seek thee in all our searchings after truth; we see thee when beauty moves us to gracious thoughts and deeds; we know thee when our hearts are enlightened with truth and love.

CONGREGATION: Thou hast set eternity in our hearts; make us patient and enduring, as those who see far-off things in the concerns of every day. Show us how to set our lives in quiet confidence to our tasks. Teach us such trust in each other that the loveliness which men hide may shine forth.

MINISTER: Deliver us from haste, from fear and from self pity. Rid us of the fever of fretfulness. Show us how to set our lives in the quiet light of eternity.

CONGREGATION: Show us such truth as we can understand and obey. Stir us with a vision of true things for man, of a brotherhood of faithful souls. Unfold thy love in us, that the fields of our life may be flooded with light and beauty and joy.

II.

MINISTER: The gateways of truth are many. Many roads lead to the treasuries of knowledge. Why should we be foolishly vain of the little fragment that we have torn from the garment of the Infinite?

CONGREGATION: May we humbly treasure the truth that we have made our own, while we honor those who find other truth in the wide fields of wisdom. We are beginners in learning: keep us from the conceit of small minds, and the arrogance of a little knowledge.

MINISTER: The fields of truth are open to all; they are not for easy satisfactions or careless dalliance. Pain is there, and struggle, and effort; but flowers are also there, in places of deep refreshment, and sanctuaries where we renew our faith and courage.

CONGREGATION: Deliver us from victories that are too easy, from the half truth that is more dangerous than folly. Stir our souls to their very depths; make our hearts warm with human feeling; give us the grace and authority that rise in us because we are divinely born.

III.

MINISTER: This place is made holy by our desires and by our sense of an Infinite Presence, nearer than breathing, closer than hands or feet. Here we learn to cross the threshold of eternal things and sit under the shadow of the Everlasting.

CONGREGATION: In grateful love and reverence we adore the Goodness that makes our lives rich. In the quietness and peace of this hour may we renew our strength. May we be fortified with truth and sweetened with beauty.

MINISTER: Our lives are surrounded with blessings; daily we touch the hem of divine wisdom, and catch glimpses of distant mountain peaks of truth; we are enfolded in Eternal Goodness.

CONGREGATION: Thy mercy, thou Infinite One, is as wide as the heavens. Thy righteousness is like the high mountains; thy judgments are deep as the sea. Thy truth is everlasting: it comes to us as rain on the mown grass. Satisfy the desires of our hearts with answers of wisdom, and cause thy loving-kindness to flow like rivers of waters.

IV.

MINISTER: O all ye prophets of olden time who spoke the liberating word, speak ye again: in the roaring streets of this our time, and in the quiet meadows of the heart.

CONGREGATION: Teach us not to count our gains and miss their value. Deliver us from the vile enchantment of fear and foolish hate. Set us free from the doom of dead things.

MINISTER: Come, ye seers of all time, ye who have dreamed for mankind, ye who have seen the march of the eternal in the midst of time:

CONGREGATION: Come! Bring new dreams, and let the dreams come true! Bring love and knit all hearts in one; bring steadfast calm into the striving hearts of human-kind; and join the cordial hands of brotherhood in all our race.

* * *

Calls to Worship

The following are found in orders of service arranged by the Rev. Edwin C. Palmer and used in The People's Church, Kalamazoo, Michigan.

I.

This day invites us to thought, to hope, to faith, to work. Together with all other days it is abundant in possibilities; more than all other days it is precious: for it is here, the present wherein only we live and labor. Heartily do we rejoice in the wonders of the universe, our home. Humbly, yet confidently, do we strive to penetrate the deeps beyond the rays of our feeble lamps, undismayed by mysteries not yet explained, undiscouraged by the limitations of our present knowledge. Remembering our yesterdays of joy and sorrow, of victory and defeat, we welcome this day with its divine task of creative living. May the fellowship of this hour inspire us in a common aim to "prepare the future and redeem the past, that after us the morning-star be bright."

II.

Enter into these gates with thanksgiving, and into these courts with praise.

The tree hath yielded its fruit, and the earth its increase.

Let us affirm the goodness that fills the earth, the glory of knowledge, the truth of religion, the strength that comes in time of need. Let us rejoice in our part in the light of the sun, in the beauty of earth, and in the infinite heaven of stars. Let us rejoice in our part in the life of the world: in the past and in all that the years have wrought; and in the

numberless blessings amid which we live and move and have our being. Let us be sharers in the common life, and builders of the world beautiful and right.

* * *

A Congregational Expression of Self-Dedication

In The Community Church of New York, immediately after the invocation, the congregation unites in the following statement, written by Dr. John Haynes Holmes:

Unto the Church Universal, which is the depository of all ancient wisdom and the school of all modern thought, which recognizes in all prophets a harmony, in all scriptures a unity, and through all dispensations a continuity; which abjures all that separates and divides, and always magnifies brotherhood and peace; which seeks truth in freedom, justice in love, and individual discipline in social duty; and which shall make of all sects, classes, nations and races, one fellowship of men—unto this Church and unto all its members, known and unknown, throughout the world, we pledge the allegiance of our hands and hearts.

* * *

This congregational utterance appears in an order of service prepared by Dr. Von Ogden Vogt for The First Unitarian Society of Chicago, Illinois.

We are united in the efforts of faith:

Faith in truth, in the growth of knowledge and of understanding;

Faith in love, in the labors and rewards of friendly living;

Faith in people, in the power of men to build an earthly commonwealth of freedom and of peace;

Faith in life, the life of all things that is the life of God, whose service is perfect freedom, whose presence is fulness of joy.

BOOKS

Humanism Around the Table

THE MEANING OF HUMANISM. By Curtis W. Reese. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1946. 53 pp. \$1.00.

The editors have asked five of Dr. Reese's colleges, not in complete agreement with him, nor among themselves, to "give in about three hundred words," their frank reactions to his latest book. The comments, uncensored and unedited, appear below.

"LIFE IS THE PRIMARY FACT"

Dr. Reese does not "isolate men from the universe" as the positivists were charged with doing, but neither does he develop adequately the full meaning of man's integral relation to his source. The author measures human progress "by the extension of liberty of persons." However, the need for liberty which made Nazi oppressions wrong and the professed "four freedoms" right is a product of the whole stream of life, and not of man alone. Like all other needs it developed in a cosmic matrix with which man's being is interpenetrated.

The humanist correctly looks to science for factual knowledge, and dismisses mysticism and intuition as channels for new knowledge. But he does not find his religion in science. Science does not produce the commitment to the cause of man that is his humanism. It does not show why a "world community of free persons is the goal." These come from intuitive grasp of the relations and implications of the facts science provides him. That intuition of the wholeness of man's life in relation to his past and future enlists his emotions and releases his imagination. So intuition still has its place in humanism.

Dr. Reese, like all who work for the betterment of mankind, needs to answer the question, "Why care?" Neo-orthodoxy, abandoning its defense of a supernatural God, attacks natural man. Serious doubts are cast on the ability and will of man to build a decent world. We hold that a more complete development of the naturalistic basis of humanism would provide a sufficient answer to the detractors of human nature. What is it in man that gives him his worth? Where does he get his status in the humanist scheme of values? It is found in his unique place in evolution. Out of "an upward continuity of process" have come new and real differences, with man the supreme example of the creative capacity of the life process. Life is the primary fact.

The realization of the integral relationship between man's whole being and the *source* of his being is a condition of human sanity.

The humanist may dismiss an other-worldly mysticism which claims to find a supernatural object beyond and behind nature, but to his peril he severs himself from a sense of wonder before the fact of life itself.

—Edwin H. Wilson

NO WORDS TO SPARE "FOR TRIBUTE"

With only 300 words at my disposal, there are none to spare for tribute to *The Meaning of Humanism*. I must spend them all in a market at which its author gives no evidence of ever shopping. Yet the goods stored there are as truly human as any other.

What is man? It is upon its answer to this question that any "humanism" is to be judged. And objections would seem to be valid if they disclose an inadequacy in the proposed humanism's account of the "human." It is just this inadequacy that I would allege in Reese's theory of man. What he neglects to draw upon is the dominant philosophical view of man as a rational animal and the dominant religious view of man as a praying animal.

"It is futile," he writes, "to seek a universally valid cosmic point of view." Is it? It is so for one who completely ignores the universal aspect of man's rational nature. If a universal ideal is to be found it must be sought in man the mathematician, man the scientist, man the metaphysician, and perhaps in man the discernor of right. If there were no laws of thought that are universally valid, if exact science had no universal ideal, then there would be no meaningful human relations and no conspicuous progress in human science. So I cannot regard as adequate any humanism that ignores man's necessary loyalty to a universal objective ideal.

Man is also a praying animal, and as such accepts the ideal as personal. Reese carefully surveys human needs, yet among them he does not include what most readers of LIBERAL RELIGION would probably regard as the most basic of all man's needs, the need for a divine Friend. If I were capable of the sort of dogmatism that affirms the universe to be "self-existing" (p. 21), I might say that such a Friend is "self-existing." But as it is, though I make a habit of saying "Thou" to the universal ideal, I would call this habit a vitalistic rather than a purely rational one, and hence rationally justifiable on pragmatic grounds. I cannot regard as adequate any humanism that takes no account of man's personal communicability with his objective ideal.

—Rowland Gray-Smith.

"THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN US"

In 1929 Dr. Reese's earlier volume and his *Humanist Sermons* converted me from anti-religion to an attitude sympathetic toward religion. Since then I have taken seriously Unitarian advice to

feed omnivorously. I have found Christianity nourishing; and I acknowledge the Christian view to be the most significant of all competing pointers toward ultimate truth. Dr. Reese's 1946 volume says that he does not. That is the only difference between us.

In his eagerness that human life flower to its utmost, I share unreservedly. But my experience as a minister has convinced me that this is achieved not by direct deliberate conquest, but rather as the by-product of man's worship and service of the Living God crucially revealed in Jesus Christ. I subscribe to Dr. Lynn Harold Hough's *Christian Humanism (The Christian Criticism of Life, 1941)*, and several preceding works which embody all the human aspirations commended by Dr. Reese but which add a Christian metaphysic, a Christian *mythos*, and a Christian church, absent in Dr. Reese's scheme. My experience has proved that these are vitally necessary to the achievement of the very ends Dr. Reese desires.

The naturalistic humanist's insistence upon scientific discourse is an impassable block to any profound understanding of religion. As a naturalistic humanist I suffered from inability to read Christian language. Now I find the Christian concepts of sin, grace, mercy, righteousness, repentance, and the like, freighted with truth concerning man's affective life, and incomparably more expressive than psychiatry, psychology, or any of the levels of discourse to which Dr. Reese would confine us.

Naturalistic humanism, even the 1946 edition, is too conservative for me. I say with the greatest Unitarian of them all, James Martineau, "... to understand what we are, or even what we contain, we must venture the embracing seas and integrate our lives with the unmeasured sphere of being. . ." Vital Protestant Christianity leads the flotilla in this adventure.

—Edward W. Ohrenstein.

"A FLOATING ISLAND IN A STORM TOSSED SEA"

Many who find themselves in complete agreement with the positive sociological and ethical teachings of this book will find that its conceptions do not grip. The reason for this is the insularity of Dr. Reese's thought. His book is a floating island in a storm-tossed sea. He has cut himself off from the great formative traditions which give meaning and direction to life and history, and from the elemental bonds which bind us to the universe in which we have our being.

He has swept aside not only "cosmic purposes" and "other worldly abstractions," but "universal values." Not only does he call for "a frank abandonment of mystic practices," but he places "no reliance on either revelation or intuition." In his sweeping denials he rules out some of the most creative elements in scientific method

and in artistic and literary composition, as well as in religion. Either he is using words carelessly, or he has asked for the abandonment of all mysticism, all intuitive perception of truth and beauty, all theism, all ground for universal ethic and even a universal scientific truth.

The false antithesis between humanism and theism, journalistic rather than logical, has done us no good, as the theological confusion of this book clearly shows. The antithesis of theism is atheism. A true humanist may be a theist, a deist, an atheist or an agnostic. Controversy on a false issue can only lead to confusion.

There is much in Dr. Reese and his work that we admire; but "the explications of the implications" of his behavior have much more to teach us than he makes articulate here.

—Leslie T. Pennington.

"I AGREE WITH FORTY-TWO FIFTY-THIRDS OF IT"

This is an admirable little book, and one I shall be glad to give to all those parishioners who ask, "But just what is humanism?"

I agree with almost everything the author says—forty-two fifty-thirds of it, as a matter of accuracy—but I cringe before the view expressed in the first eleven pages. Here is stated the familiar anti-intellectualist view of much pragmatism and science. "It is futile to seek a universally valid cosmic point of view," writes Dr. Reese. The "futile to seek . . ." frightens me. Were I sure of a divine element within me, I might have the presumption to assert that seeking was futile; but fearing I am only human, I hesitate to conclude I need not search further.

This is not the criticism by a believer of an unbeliever; but as one unbeliever to another, I say to Dr. Reese that I cannot hesitate to probe the depths of the universe with the instrument of thought so long as I am able. Whether I shall foist my always temporary conclusions off on anyone else is another matter, and there I think I agree with Dr. Reese again.

This willing limitation of thought prescribes a limitation of the humanist view. Personally, I feel that the pragmatists have failed to understand the use of thought. They have understood its many minor uses and not its major use, which is to give breadth and depth to our feelings and emotions. It is as if they insist only on recognizing the *denotation* of a word, and closing out all *connotation*.

The word "Humanist" as Dr. Reese uses it (capital H) may be an example. The "human" refers quite clearly most of the time in his little book to the two billion or so men now alive. It is an uncomplimentary use of the word. When he talks of humanism's judging everything by its contribution to the fulfillment of man's needs, he means *men's* needs. No meaning for the word is indi-

cated beyond the mere sum of men now living. But men share some things with the universe from which they have come, and human to me has some meaning beyond the species *homo sapiens*. In fact, man will not be understood until his inheritance is understood, as well as his responsibility and all his relationships with objects and events beyond himself in the universe. The idea of fulfillment can only be fully explained with reference to the whole universe.

I agree with the humanists—in so far as Dr. Reese's book represents them—in what they wish to deny, and I agree with what they are trying to do; but I break out in the cold sweat of fear when they tell me there are some things we don't have to think about.

—Thaddeus B. Clark.

DR. REESE MAKES HIS REPLY

My critics have not been too severe, but I think they missed a chance to show fundamental distinctions that exist between even the most moderate humanism and the most liberal theism. For example, an irreducible minimum for theism is some sort of cosmic guaranty of human values; but humanism claims no such guaranty. Another fundamental distinction is that between a relative and an absolute ethic. There are other important and vital distinctions that really make a difference; and it is distressing to find theists not concerned about them.

Thaddeus B. Clark and Rowland Gray-Smith both scored good points in their attack on what I certainly appeared to mean about "the futility of seeking a universally valid cosmic point of view." It was not, however, my intention to set limits to human inquiry. On the contrary I hold that we should assume both that the universe is understandable and that the human mind is increasingly equal to the task. As the context shows, I was speaking of diverse experiences resulting in diverse views of the universe. But I must confess that I find it difficult to conceive of a universally valid cosmic point of view unless relativity itself is such.

Various references, including especially those of Edwin Wilson, indicate some doubt as to whether I sufficiently regard man as organic to the universe. Of course man is organic to the universe, as I stated specifically on page 22. No doubt what my critics sense is my lack of pride in the relationship of man to a somewhat messy natural world and an explosive universe.

Edward Ohrenstein appears to be committed to an exclusive, not to say sectarian, Christian metaphysic, and consequently is so far removed from my position that communication would be difficult to establish in the space available.

Most of Leslie T. Pennington's comments are extraneous to the thesis suggested in the book. I was at some pains not to present humanism as the antithesis of any other theory, but as a move-

ment travelling down a highway of its own. I can agree fully with his description of theology and claim theological status for any humanist who attempts "straight, clear, hard, comprehensive, and honest thought about religion." Mr. Pennington, however, should think seriously before he is finally committed to his own description of theology, for the process suggested does not necessarily involve any particular content, theistic or otherwise.

It is a good omen for the Unitarian movement that it has room for such diversity of opinions.

—Curtis W. Reese

Mumford's "Inadequate Sequel"

VALUES FOR SURVIVAL. By Lewis Mumford. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946. 314 pp. \$3.00.

In this collection of essays, addresses, and letters, Lewis Mumford presents many interesting ideas and suggestions in the fields of education and politics which are worthy of serious consideration. His emphasis upon the necessity of a change in motivations and satisfactions for the survival of civilization is timely, penetrating, and prophetic.

As one reads these contributions which were written between the spring of 1938 and the fall of 1945, one keeps wishing that the author of *Technics and Civilization*, *The Culture of Cities*, and *The Condition of Man*, had developed these ideas more fully in a volume comparable to these previous contributions. Another deterring factor is that one is never quite sure whether Mumford is going to undergird his values for survival with the reactionary theology of Reinhold Niebuhr or the liberal philosophy of John Dewey or Whitehead. This leads to considerable confusion in his own presentation of the problem of ends and means in both education and politics.

While this book does fall short of being an adequate sequel to *The Condition of Man*, it is recommended for reading. There are many germane ideas. Its implicit and, in one chapter, overt approach to civilization is not the traditional one of "past, present and future" but rather the relativistic "past, present and possible."

Randall S. Hilton.

Poems "To Be Read Slowly and with Care"

WAR AND THE POET. Edited by Richard Eberhart and Selden Rodman. New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1945. 240 pp. \$3.00.

The appearance of this anthology would have excited much more interest had it been timed for earlier publication. But this is a better time for the thoughtful reader to assess such a volume as this, now that we are not keyed up to war's sacrifices, idealizations

and rationalizations.

The development of war-poetry, from earliest literatures to the present, is discussed in an introductory essay which is recommended reading for all ministers. Poets in all ages have written on war, one of the great constants of man's experience. It seems to have been among the thoughtful and highly civilized dramatists of ancient Greece that great anti-war poetry first made its appearance.

There are war poems and anti-war poems from Whitman, Hardy, Robinson Jeffers (not represented), and others, that I should like to have seen included. But the inclusions are varied, cover a wide historical perspective and are of a high order of poetic merit in every instance. A few extraordinary modern "finds" are included, as also the better known recent war poets such as Louis Aragon, Karl Shapiro, Dylan Thomas, Robert Lowell, Gervase Stewart.

This book is worth buying or borrowing. It is to be read slowly and with care. Blake's *Jerusalem*, Longfellow's *The Arsenal at Springfield*, Hardy's *The Man He Killed*, Stephen Crane's *War is Kind*, Ilya Ehrenburg's *Our Children's Children Will Marvel*, Wilfred Owen's *Strange Meeting*, Marianne Moore's *In Distrust of Merits*, W. H. Auden's *Far From the Heart of Culture*, Demetrios Capetanakis' *Abel*, Gervase Stewart's *I Burn for England with a Living Flame*, and some others you will find, are scriptural, and worth reading from the lectern and the pulpit. **Jacob Trapp.**

No Mere Epicurean Adventure

DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE. *By Louis Adamic*, New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1946. 276 pp. \$2.50.

At this fearful moment, when the peace so dearly won seems again to be slipping from our grasp, we should welcome this timely entreaty for a quickening of our moral and political discernment. Louis Adamic is well qualified to make this appeal, for he has long been in the vanguard of American democratic thought, and he possesses not only the fundamental knowledge for understanding our critical situation, but the ability to deal with it effectively.

The author's informal rendezvous with the President, Mrs. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, on the eve of the Prime Minister's return to England in January 1942, was brought about through unusual circumstances. The event itself was more than an epicurean adventure, for the menu also consisted of courses of meaningful dialogue and humorous repartee, which afforded the author an opportunity to study intimately two dynamic personalities and seek for the deep significance of their historic relationship.

Certainly these two great leaders possessed the power to change, for better or for worse, the shape of things to come; but did they find a common ground for agreement when it came to the post-war

reconstruction of Europe, the question of free trade or Britain's colonial policy? Mr. Adamic doesn't think so, for at the dinner he had heard F.D.R. say: "You know my friend over there doesn't understand how most of our people feel about Britain and her role in the life of other people. . . . There are many kinds of Americans of course, but as a people, as a country, we're opposed to imperialism—we can't stomach it."

Regardless of what the historians will say of his leadership, the man who now rests in a rose garden left the world a precious legacy; and our common destiny depends on how wisely we use it. He wasn't a radical or a revolutionary, and still. "Franklin Roosevelt's leadership saved the country. It also helped save the world from being overwhelmed by what is the worst in it." While little time remains, we must absorb and act upon the irrefutable fact that "he left the American people another opportunity—perhaps the last—to make this favored land between two oceans a great and good place."

Will the United Nations—One World idea succeed? Only if America's conscience gets behind it "with a powerful determination that justice and equality become a perceptible trend here and the world over." Mr. Adamic sees little hope of working out a *modus vivendi* between the American and Russian ways of life as long as "the orthodox patriots in the State Department" continue to shape our foreign policy; or as long as they and other powerful "men of the moment" suppress democracy in other lands, while simultaneously projecting "the idea that the Anglo-Americans own a patent on democratic processes."

The reader will find the reason why this big-little book was not published sooner, and that some of its early content is weakened on that account; but the message has lost none of its original vigor, and it contains the spiritual quality which will help puncture "the political and ideological vacuum in which most Americans now exist."

"Dinner at the White House" is a feast for the famished hopes of frustrated cynics, as well as all men of good will who seek inspiration and denouement, from broader visions than their own.

Get hold of this courageous book and let it get hold of you.

Edward Drew Gourley.

How to Believe in Christianity

THE IDEA OF CHRIST IN THE GOSPELS. By George Santayana. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946. 254 pp. \$2.75.

The congeniality of Santayana's philosophical position with classical Christianity is an interesting subject of speculation. From this essay it would seem that the affinity is quite real. He has here offered an interpretation of the Gospels as inspiration appropriate

to the concepts of life and of personality which he holds. Quite frankly he scorns the critical approach, stating that the character of these documents requires that they be considered not as historical works but as products of inspiration. He asks certain religious presuppositions as a basis for the understanding of the gospels. The pious mind alone, can gather their truth.

The truth which Santayana sees available to the pious mind through the Gospels is that Jesus was the revelation of God in man. Thus he treats the various features in terms of the conveyance of this revelation.

In commenting on this book the writer is not in a position to judge fully the exegetical soundness of Santayana's work. There are indications of thoroughness and familiarity with the texts. The main emphasis, however, is on the reliability, from a pious viewpoint, of the doctrinal ideas embodied. In his presentation the doctrines are well rationalized and offered much in the character of classical Christianity, congenial in some degree to both Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. The neo-orthodox and the classicists should find the book somewhat helpful to their viewpoint.

This is a puzzling book. Why it should be written is not entirely clear. Santayana writes it casually, not passionately. It is as if he were saying, "If you want to believe in Christianity this is ~~the~~ way you should do it." Indeed, he makes it quite clear in his last paragraph that he has no great expectations in this regard. He says that the world does not wish to be saved; that "if we say the world thereby wills its damnation, we are venting our private displeasure, without frightening the world"; that "those who miss these things do not regret missing them."

Dale DeWitt

A Faith Reexamined and Reaffirmed

THE PROBLEMS OF MEN. By John Dewey. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946. 424 pp. \$5.00.

For those of us who have developed the habit of keeping abreast of the writings of John Dewey he is more than a landmark in philosophic thinking; he is an institution whose books will be read for more years to come than we can now foresee or predict, and whose influence is already beyond all calculation. Outside the borders of our own country, and especially in China and Russia, has his naturalistic approach to the problems of human thought created a deep and lasting impression.

As long ago as 1887 Prof. Dewey wrote his *Psychology*. In 1919 he gave a memorable series of lectures in Japan which later were published under the title, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*. Then came *How We Think*, and such educational books as *Democracy and Education*, *School and Society* and *Human Nature and Conduct*. His *Experience and Nature*, which most fully expounds his philosophy,

was published in 1925. It was followed by *The Quest for Certainty* (Gifford Lectures), *A Common Faith*, *Art as Experience*, *Liberalism and Social Action*, *Freedom and Culture* and others.

Problems of Men is a re-statement of many of Dewey's educational and philosophical theories which have long been familiar to his readers, and it constitutes, as it were, a reaffirmation of his faith in applied intelligence as our only hope for a better world.

That his optimism of earlier years has been severely tested—and not always justified—Dr. Dewey is the first to admit. Indeed, he enumerates in this newest of his books, the items of his faith of fifty years ago, acknowledging, as it were, how badly his expectations fared; but he speaks of the liberal faith generally, whose eloquent spokesman he was and still is. We expected, for example—fifty years ago—that war would be gradually abolished by the growing inter-dependence of man. We looked for the steady increase of enlightenment and, with it, a greater measure of freedom and equality for all men. We expected a lessening of governmental interference with human freedom, and an increase of human understanding and tolerance. We expected automatically, a steadily rising standard of living for all peoples.

All these expectations have either come to naught or they have not been fulfilled to any degree commensurate with our earlier optimism; and liberalism has had to make a drastic revision of its estimates both as to the extent and the acceleration of human progress. The mistake, of course, was to assume that by some historic process these things would happen. Liberals seriously underestimated the extent to which they would have to make them happen, or lose everything by default.

Another revision which liberals have been called upon to make was with reference to the very nature of change. Always the old problems become new problems; always unexpected and unforeseeable problems emerge amidst our changing scientific and technological circumstances, bringing changes into the human situation. Half the people working in shops and factories in this country, for example, are working in industries which did not even exist forty years ago.

There is also the familiar problem of human freedom with which Prof. Dewey has come to grips in practically every book which he has written. The last four centuries have displayed an ever-increasing revolt against authority. For the greater part of human history man has been content with things as they were. He is no longer content. Now, fearing change, he is nevertheless compelled by the frustration of his life to seek and welcome it; and being individualistic, there are nevertheless choices and decisions which he cannot wisely or safely make for himself.

The real issue is not that of demarcating separate spheres for

authority and for freedom, for stability and for change, but of bringing about an interpenetration of the two. There is no freedom in the return to or the rehabilitation of old institutions; neither is there freedom in the "pitiless pitting" of individuals against individuals. Modern man's freedom must be general and shared, and must have the backing and the guidance of socially organized and intelligent control.

It is thus that under present conditions liberalism must become radical in the sense that, instead of using social power to *ameliorate* the evil consequences of the existing system, it shall use social power to *change* the system. And as a footnote it might be added that Dewey would certainly include religious systems and institutions, as well as economic and political, under this general observation.

Dewey has always contended^{*} that the problems of men are the problems of our natural world. Empirical naturalism he calls his method of approach; and it is at this point that pertinent questions arise for many readers of this journal: Can religion be thought of as *completely* this-worldly in its nature and experience? Can historic Protestantism ever, as Protestantism, achieve the necessary orientation? It is doubtful, but Prof. Dewey would probably say that nothing less than such an achievement can ever make religion a great power in the world of tomorrow. Meanwhile, those who still have Dewey books on their agenda of unfinished reading might very well begin with *Problems of Men*; and particularly for ministers does this suggestion seem appropriate.

Edwin T. Buehrer

An Economic Program for a Living Democracy

Irving H. Flamm. New York: Liveright Publishing Company.
342 pp. \$3.00.

Science and technology have so transformed conditions in America that today the poorest family could be well fed and clothed, comfortably housed in a sanitary, well-equipped dwelling, receive the advantages of an education, be protected against the hazards of illness and accident and freed from the specter of unemployment and destitution—all with a work week of 30 hours or less. Included, also, would be provision for recreation and culture for leisure and for retirement on a comfortable pension after a normal span of years. This is only another way of saying what technologists have been saying for a long time, namely, that our country's productive capacity is adequate to give the lowest paid family a standard of living equal to that of one who now enjoys an

income of \$6,000 a year. That should be the minimum, others enjoying more according to the value of their work.

Needless to say, our country has the resources, the industrial equipment and the human skill to use it. What we lack is an intelligent system of production and distribution to replace the present anarchy and planlessness. Science has made miraculous progress in every field except that of human relations. The result is insecurity in every rank except for the tiny fraction of those who possess huge properties and wealth.

Irving Flamm's book clearly shows the causes that brought on the collapse of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed. He shows the absurdity of applying the methods of small business of a century ago to the giant corporations that today dominate industry and finance. He shows how futile have been the efforts to "regulate" these and the still more hopeless futility of attempts to suppress such combinations, whether by taxation or by statutory prohibition. Despite restraining laws they gradually strangle and paralyze all opposition, and inevitably bring on the cycles of "boom and bust" that foolish people have come to think of as a natural and inevitable feature of modern life.

Mr. Flamm offers a plan which combines the quick, resolute action required by the tempo of our times, with a minimum of coercion. He would be "considerate" of vested interests, while effectively cancelling out their present veto power on the changes which new world conditions demand. The plan is comparable to that required for the reorganization of a corporation—a not uncommon experience. It would stop short of confiscation while at the same time avoiding a heavy load of interest-bearing debt.

The book is a rich mine of useful information.

Charles H. Coyle.

Introducing Our Contributors

Curtis W. Reese, for more than twenty years dean of the Abraham Lincoln Center, in Chicago, has achieved distinction, also, as a leader in the field of religious humanism. . . . **Edwin C. Broome, Jr.**, is minister of the Unitarian Church at Belmont, Massachusetts. . . . **Sebastian de Grazia** is a member of the faculty of political science at the University of Chicago. . . . **John H. Hershey**, a Unitarian minister living in Bridgewater, Massachusetts, is editor of an informative quarterly publication, **Latin-American Thought**. . . . **Harry C. Steinmetz** is a member of the faculty of philosophy of the University of California at Los Angeles.

Randall S. Hilton is Secretary of the Western Unitarian Conference. He lives in Chicago. . . . **Edwin H. Wilson** is editor of *The Humanist*, a national quarterly journal published in Salt Lake City, Utah. . . . **Rowland Gray-Smith** is professor of philosophy at Emerson College, Boston. . . . **Thaddeus B. Clark** is minister of the First Unitarian Church of St. Louis. . . . **Edward W. Ohrenstein** is dean of the Starr King School for the Ministry in Berkeley, California. . . . **Jacob Trapp**, a poet in his own right, is minister of the Unitarian Church in Summit, New Jersey. . . . **Edward Drew Gourley** is an artist, a student of world affairs and a journalist. His home is in Glenview, Illinois. . . . **Leslie T. Pennington** is the minister of the First Unitarian Church, Chicago. . . . **Charles H. Coyle** is a business man in Berwyn, Illinois. . . . **Dale De Witt** is Regional Director of the Middle Atlantic States Council (Unitarian) of New York City.

The Journal of

LIBERAL RELIGION

A national quarterly developed as a medium of expression for "creative and scholarly writing" by religious liberals.

Conspicuous new books in every field of inquiry are reviewed by competent critics in the light of their contribution to progressive religious thought.

New service materials—hymns, meditations, responsive readings—for use in free churches, selected, edited and arranged by Vincent B. Silliman, constitute a new and stirring feature in every issue. The steady accumulation of these materials alone is a rich contribution to religious thought and expression.

ONE YEAR, \$1.00

THREE YEARS, \$2.50

Single copies 25 cents, plus mailing. In quantities of ten or more copies, 20 cents each, postpaid.

THE STARR KING SCHOOL for the MINISTRY

Affiliated with the Pacific School of Religion

Adjoining Berkeley campus, University of California.

The Pacific center for Unitarian and
Universalist Theological Training.

For information write

**The Rev. Edward Whitefield Ohrenstein
2441 Le Conte Ave., Berkeley 4, Calif.**